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The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Park Safety:
A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain
State-Governed
I.

Introduction

Every year, millions and millions of Americans hurtle through space toward
Mars, freefall down the shafts of once-forgotten elevators, and become real-life crash test
dummies through a series of harrowing and near disastrous auto tests — and they do it all
without suffering so much as a scratch.
Such is life in a magical kingdom.
Today, at amusement parks across the country guests test the thrills of
increasingly high-tech multi-million dollar rides and attractions. Destinations like Walt
Disney World, Universal Orlando, Busch Gardens and the various Six Flags parks all
provide the average American an opportunity to try unique experiences — and to test
their mettle while doing so — on rides with such notorious names as Dueling Dragons,
Demon Drop, and the Tower of Terror.
Yet, for all the high energy thrills enjoyed by guests (including this author), an
important question remains: Are these high-tech attractions really safe? And, more
importantly, who ultimately decides what “safe” means?
In the theme park industry, injuries and even deaths do occur. However, while
any death or serious injury is certainly tragic, the statistics to date all demonstrate that
serious injuries and deaths are very rare in the fixed-site amusement park industry.1
Despite this, several members of Congress have, over the years, introduced various bills
that seek to assign complete safety regulatory authority over fixed-site amusement parks
to the federal government, and more particularly the United States Consumer Product
Safety Commission (the “CPSC”).
The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 2003 (the “NAPRSA”) is
another effort in that direction. The bill itself is a short one-page bill that essentially
seeks to reverse a 1981 amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (the
“CPSA”).2 That amendment sought to clarify that fixed-site amusement parks do not fall
within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.3 The proponents of overturning this 1981 amendment are
seeking to federalize the safety regulation of fixed-site attractions. They point to an
alleged increase in guest injuries, and the fact that some states have not enacted safety
regulations, as sufficiently compelling grounds for removing this authority from the states
and transferring it to the CPSC.
Not surprisingly, the amusement park industry has staunchly opposed any efforts
to federalize the safety regulation of fixed-site amusement parks by arguing that the
existing state and local regulations have effectively protected the general public’s
1

In most statutes, including the Consumer Product Safety Act, an amusement attraction is “any mechanical
device which carries or conveys passengers along, around, or over a fixed or restricted route or course or
within a defined area for the purpose of giving its passengers amusement”. 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (2003); See
also Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 7901 (Lexis 2003) and N.Y. Lab. Law § 870-c (Consol. 2003). A “fixed-site”
amusement park would be one containing amusement attractions that are permanently attached to the
premises.
2
See H.R. 2207, 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003).
3
See Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).

2

amusement-riding safety to date and, therefore, there is no reason to disturb the status
quo.
This article will trace the development and current status of consumer safety
regulation in general with a specific focus on fixed-site amusement park safety
regulation. In doing so, the article will demonstrate that, historically, the development of
fixed-site amusement park safety regulations has been a state-governed issue falling
under the scope of the traditional state police power doctrine. The article will then
analyze the states’ current safety laws and regulations and will argue that keeping these
regulations within the states’ regulatory province will successfully accomplish the
ultimate goal of protecting amusement park guest safety better than the current
Congressional effort to federalize fixed-site attraction safety regulation under the CPSC.
Finally, because several states have no existing regulations—and because several other
states have very minimal regulations--this article will offer a proposed model state safety
law for fixed-site amusement parks based upon a comparative analysis of existing state
regulations.
II.

The Development and Current Status of Consumer Safety and Fixed-Site
Amusement Park Safety Regulation.

In order to understand the state of today’s amusement park laws and regulation,
one must first identify the legal principles that preceded these laws. Doing so provides
not only a chronological understanding of the history of these laws, but also provides
greater insight into the substance of these laws. In other words, not just “how” they came
to be, but “why” they came to be. This provides a historical legal context for an issue
such as amusement park safety regulation that—since amusement parks themselves are a
relatively recent cultural phenomenon—many might presume is a fairly nascent area of
regulatory coverage.
In fact, the opposite is true. While amusement parks were only introduced to
audiences in the United States in the last century, the underlying legal concept—
consumer safety regulation—has a long, and somewhat abstract, history in this country.
A. The State’s Traditional Police Power over Consumer Safety Issues: the
Origin of Amusement Park Safety Regulation.
"The [s]tates traditionally have had great latitude under
their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons." 4
Generally, the states’ authority to regulate fixed-site amusement parks has been
established through each State’s “police power” to govern public safety. The term “police
power,” however, is not found in the United States Constitution. Search for the same
term in the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation or even the Magna
Carta and one still will not find it. In other words, the term “police power” is noticeably
absent from all of these democracy-shaping documents. Yet despite this absence, courts
4

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985)(internal
quotation marks omitted).
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in the United States have consistently recognized that the states possess certain police
powers — most notably over issues involving public safety, health, and morals.5 And,
even more importantly, the states have generally not simply recognized these powers in
the abstract, but have utilized them to safeguard their citizens from various dangers —
including those caused by consumer products.6
Despite the fact that the states had historically exercised their police powers to
govern safety issues, a trend toward allowing the federal government to exercise
regulatory authority over several traditionally State-governed matters began to develop in
the mid to late 1800s. This development evolved out of the Supreme Court’s expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in light of the federal government’s attempt to use
that clause to federalize issues that had heretofore been governed by the states.7
One of the first examples of the United States Supreme Court permitting the
federal government to regulate an area that had traditionally been governed by states
occurred in Gibbons v. Ogden.8 In Gibbons, the Supreme Court was called upon to
5

What is the source of these fairly vague yet highly important powers? Unfortunately, the answer is not as
simple as citing a Constitutional clause or amendment. Instead, the idea of the State’s police powers is
founded in a sort of “natural law” type argument. As early as the mid 1800s, the United States Supreme
Court had begun recognizing that States possessed certain regulatory powers termed “police powers”. The
Court rhetorically asked “[W]hat are the police powers of a State?” in 1847. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46
U.S. 504, 583 (1847).
Yet, the Court’s own answer to that question did little to pinpoint the exact origin of these powers.
Instead, the Court seemed to adopt a position that the States’ police powers were more akin to natural rights
“inherently” afforded a sovereign rather than regulatory powers established by code or law. “They are
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. . .” Id. (emphasis added).
The Court’s ambiguity in citing the source of such extensive powers is striking. In many ways it
adopts the approach of “I know it is here, but I have no idea how it got here.” Nevertheless, while the
courts have uniformly agreed that the States’ police powers exist, they continually have struggled to
pinpoint the source of this existence: “[t]his power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any
very exact definition or limitation.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872). It is worth noting
though that the inability to define the precise source of these powers has not been isolated to a single set of
jurists. Instead, this issue has perplexed more than one Court: “What that power is, it is difficult to define
with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order,
morals, health, and safety.” Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-471 (1877).
6
In addition to theoretical underpinnings, the States’ police powers remained intact post-Constitution
because of a very practical reality: the States were generally best-situated and best-equipped to exercise
police powers: “Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to protect the
health and safety of their citizens. Because these are ‘primarily, and historically, ... matter[s] of local
concern.’" Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
7
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion in U.S. v Lopez gives a concise examination of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
One of his primary arguments is that since the New Deal, its language has been misinterpreted by
the “substantial effects” test. “This test, if taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a ‘police
power’ over all aspects of American life.” Id. at 584. Nothing would be excluded from the reach of the
Commerce Clause.
When the Constitution was written, commerce had a narrow definition, consisting of “selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.” Id. at 585. The problem arises today
when the Court fails to distinguish between interstate commerce, wholly intrastate commerce, and
activities that affect interstate commerce. Id. at 595.
8
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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determine the constitutionality of a New York state law granting exclusive license to
operate steamships within its waters to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton. Ogden
claimed an exclusive right, granted by Livingston and Fulton, to operate a steamship on
the route between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and brought suit
against Gibbons to prevent him from competing on the same route. New Jersey and
Connecticut had conflicting statutes regulating steam travel on their waterways. The
Court determined that the New York statute inhibited commerce among the states, and
“that Congress may control the State laws, so far as it may be necessary to control them,
for the regulation of commerce.”9
Gibbons essentially opened the door for the federal government to regulate
traditionally state-governed issues if it deemed itself best situated to do so. While
somewhat slow to embrace this notion within the context of consumer safety regulation,
by the end of the century, the federal government began to displace the states as the chief
regulator of consumer safety.
B. The Federal Government’s Push Toward Exercising Regulatory Jurisdiction
Over Consumer Safety Issues.
Even though the mainstream media’s interest in fixed-site amusement park safety
regulation has only been piqued relatively recently10, the federal government’s effort to
obtain regulatory control over amusement attractions in fixed-site attractions is not a
recent development. In fact, during the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the CPSC actually
filed several complaints seeking regulatory sanctions against operators of amusement
attractions within fixed-site attractions. Not surprisingly, a slew of lawsuits over this
issue quickly ensued between fixed-site parks and the CPSC. In 1981, however, just
before the United States Supreme Court was prepared to hear oral arguments on this
issue, Congress passed an amendment to the CPSA that finally clarified that fixed-site
amusement parks do not fall within the CPSC’s regulatory jurisdiction.
Today—over two decades later—a variety of legal and political forces have
revived this issue, returning it to the national spotlight. To truly understand the complex
dynamics at work, one must return to the origin of this dispute: Congress’ first steps
toward regulating consumer safety on a federal level.

9

Id. at 206.
While accidents, and amusement park safety in general, have always received media coverage, such
coverage has grown increasingly widespread within recent years. The following reports and articles are a
survey of the growing scope and type of media outlets covering this issue: CNN String of Amusement Park
Accidents Causing Concern (Aug. 26, 1999), available at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9908/26/rollercoasters.01/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004); CNN,
Congressional Panel Begins Hearings on Roller Coaster Safety(May 17, 2000), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/05/17/amusement.park.safety/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004); Eye on
America: Amusement Park Accidents May Be More Widespread Than Believed (CBS Evening News
television broadcast Aug. 20, 2001); Troubling Summer for Amusement Parks (ABC World News Sunday
television broadcast, Aug. 29, 1999); John Seewer, Amusement Parks Put Science Into the Scream, Say It
Makes Rides Safer, AP WORLDSTREAM, June 10, 2002; Sean Wood, Congressman to Press for Federal
Regulation of Amusement Parks, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 25, 2003.
10
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1. The Federal Government’s First Steps Toward National Consumer
Safety Regulation.
During much of its first one hundred years of existence, Congress generally
avoided the regulation of consumer safety on a national level. Instead, Congress left it to
the states, through their inherent police powers, to regulate consumer safety issues such
as product safety, food safety, drug safety, and other consumer-related activities.11 In
1879, however, the United States Department of Agriculture took the lead in one of the
first efforts toward federalizing a consumer safety issue. The department, led by its chief
chemist Peter Collier, lobbied Congress to pass a bill giving them general regulatory
authority over food products. 12 These efforts were largely induced by two events: 1) the
growing scientific knowledge of germ theory and how it could contaminate the food
supply; and 2) the increasing problem of consumers unknowingly purchasing adulterated
food as the economy and society shifted from a local food supply to a more nationalized
food supply.13
This debate ended up pitting supporters of the farming industry, who favored a
national law protecting the “natural” food supply, against the food-processing industry
that opposed efforts to restrict the use of preservatives designed to alter the color, flavor,
11

In 1784, for example, Massachusetts passed a law regarding food standards in what is generally
considered to be one of the first consumer regulatory acts in this country. FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/aboutcvm/ aboutbeg.htm (accessed Dec. 6, 2004).
Whereas some evilly disposed persons, from motives of avarice and filthy lucre, have
been induced to sell corrupted, contagious or unwholesome provisions, to the great
nuisance of public health and peace :
Be it therefore enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That
if any person shall sell any such diseased, corrupted, contagious or
unwholesome provisions, whether for meat or drink, knowing the
same, without making it known to the buyer, and being thereof convicted
before the Justices of the General Sessions of the Peace, in the
county where such offence shall be committed, or the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court, he shall be punished by fine, imprisonment,
standing in the pillory, and binding to the good behaviour, or one or
more of these punishments, to be inflicted according to the degree
and aggravation of the offence.

An Act Against Selling Unwholesome Provisions, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 50 (1784), available at
http://www.state.ma.us/dph/pdf/s98-1.pdf (as of Mar. 8, 2004).
12
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CURRENT AND USEFUL INFORMATION FROM THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (1999), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/mileston.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
13
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR THE 1906 LAW
(1981), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/ history2.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004); One example
of this problem involved the “embalmed beef scandal”. This scandal arose out of canned meat that had a
suspicious grayish coloring and had been served to American soldiers (such as the famous Rough Riders)
during the war. Allegations arose that this beef was actually partially-decomposed meat that had been
spoiled in the humid climate of the war’s locale. These unsanitary conditions were blamed on, among other
things, improperly trained food personnel and improperly regulated food conditions. Ultimately, the
scandal led to a series of charges before a court of inquiry as well as improved food regulations. See
Edward F. Keuchel, Chemicals and Meat: The Embalmed Beef Scandal of the Spanish-American War, 48
BULLETIN OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 249-264 (1974).
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texture, and other features of the food supply. Advocates of a federal law for regulating
the food supply pressed the issue with their argument that existing state regulations were
insufficient to protect the general public. As one commentator described the debate:
Discoveries in chemistry, for example, led to new synthetic medicines and
altered radically both the growing and the processing of food.
Transportation developments brought processed food to an increasingly
national market, making the growth of giant cities possible. The residents
of those cities lost the ability villagers had possessed of being first-hand
judges of the food they ate.14
In essence, advocates of a federal approach based their arguments on the premise
that, even though the food supply might have previously been effectively regulated by the
states in a generally local and intrastate society, the urbanization of America had created
a much more interstate food supply. Because of this, the federal government was better
situated to efficiently regulate such a national food supply. As one commentator wrote:
[t]he debate in 1886 between the defenders of a natural food and those of
its alleged artificial substitute centered not only on matters of vested
interest, but also pondered concerns about the public health, issues of
governmental authority, and the myths in which were enshrined the
meaning of the American experience.15
Despite persistent efforts to pass such a law, Congress failed to enact any national
regulation for the remainder of the 19th century. As the 20th century began, however,
support for national consumer food safety legislation continued to increase to the point
that it appeared such a law was likely. One of the primary forces behind this increased
support was Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book The Jungle, in which he exposed some of the
increasingly unhygienic practices of the meatpacking industry. Faced with documented
evidence of serious abuses in the nation’s food supply, public opinion quickly shifted and
soon President Theodore Roosevelt, who until now had offered very little, if any, support
for a national consumer food safety law, now also pressed Congress to pass such a
national law.
Those efforts finally succeeded in June 1906, when Congress reversed course and
passed both the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act.16 These laws are
generally considered to be the first federal laws regulating consumer safety.17 And, in
14

JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR THE 1906 LAW
(1981), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/ history2.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
15
Id.
16
Lest anyone think that these Acts represent little more than a minor historical footnote, the national
importance of the Pure Food and Drugs Act was confirmed on January 15, 1998 when the United States
Postal Service released a commemorative stamp as part of a series of stamps honoring the major historical
events of the United States from the 20th Century. See Press Release, United States Department of Health
and Human Services, New Stamp Honors The First Comprehensive National Food And Drug Law (Jan. 13,
1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00613.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
17
While they were certainly the most noteworthy and publicized laws, whether these two laws were
actually the “first” consumer safety laws is debatable. For example, in 1883, Congress passed the an act to
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many ways, they were the first steps in a dramatic chain of events that would forever
change the states’ roles in regulating consumer safety issues. 18
2. The Continued Growth of the Federal Government’s Regulation of
Consumer Safety Issues.
The federalization of consumer safety regulation certainly did not begin and end
with food and drugs.19 In fact, over the next 60 years, Congress continued to expand the
federal government’s role in regulating consumer safety issues beyond food and drugs
and into a wide range of other consumer products and activities. However, rather than
taking an omnibus approach toward regulating consumer products and activities as a
whole, Congress chose to accomplish this expansion through a series of self-standing acts
that regulated individual consumer products and that were administered by a variety of
different federal department and agencies. In fact, the broad, decentralized nature of the
federal government’s consumer regulatory activities was evidenced by the fact that, at

regulate the purity of imported tea. Impure Tea Act, 22 Stat. 451 (1883). Likewise, in 1902, Congress
passed a different act to regulate the safety of certain vaccines and medicines offered to the public.
Biologics Control Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902).
Regardless of which law should be given the title of “first federal consumer safety law”, the fact
remains that the era from 1879 to 1906 ushered in the federal government’s intrusion into the previously
State- dominated province of consumer safety and health regulation.
18
Roosevelt’s signing of the Meat Inspection Act and Pure Food and Drug Act were two examples of the
trend toward “nationalizing” issues that affected citizens of more than just one state or locality. Termed
“The New Nationalism”, Roosevelt’s own words clearly signaled the growing trend away from a Statecentric regulatory system and toward a Federal Government-driven system:
I do not ask for overcentralization; but I do ask that we work in a spirit of broad and farreaching nationalism when we work for what concerns our people as a whole…The
national government belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole
American people are interested, that interest can be guarded effectively only by the
national government. The betterment which we seek must be accomplished, I believe,
mainly through the national government….The American people are right in demanding
that New Nationalism, without which we cannot hope to deal with new problems. The
New Nationalism puts the national need before sectional or personal advantage. It is
impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat
national issues as local issues.
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Address in Osawatomie, Kansas (Aug. 31, 1910), available at
http://www.tamu.edu/ comm/pres/speeches/trnew.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
19
Nor did the regulation of food and drugs themselves begin and end with the Pure Food and Drug Act. In
fact the federal government would take two more important regulatory actions concerning consumer safety
regulation as it relates to food and drugs before 1940. First, in 1927, Congress created a new regulatory
administration charged with regulating consumer safety over these products. 44 Stat. 976, 1002 (1927).
The agency was named the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration and would later become known as
today’s Food and Drug Administration. 46 Stat. 392, 422 (1930).
The second pivotal event occurred in 1938 when Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(h), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
321(h)(1994)). Among its groundbreaking provisions, this Act required manufacturers to obtain product
safety approval prior to offering a new drug to the public and also authorized the new federal agency to
conduct factory inspections and bring court actions to enforce its food and drug regulations.
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one point, 33 different departments and agencies regulated over 100 various consumer
activities.20
For example, in 1953, Congress passed the Flammable Fabrics Act.21 This Act
arose after a series of high profile incidents in which children wearing cowboy playsuits
were seriously injured or killed after the outfits they were wearing ignited. Support for
the Act was further bolstered following a series of instances in which individuals were
seriously injured or killed when the sweaters they were wearing ignited.22 When passed,
the Act essentially gave the Federal Trade Commission complete regulatory authority
over the safety of consumer clothing. Subsequently, in 1967, the Flammable Fabrics Act
was expanded to also give the Federal Trade Commission general safety regulatory
authority over interior furnishings such as rugs and carpets also. 23
Another example of Congress’ piecemeal approach of regulating specific
products, rather than consumer activities as a whole, was the Refrigerator Safety Act.24
The Refrigerator Safety Act was passed in 1956 following several years of increasing
deaths among children who had suffocated after being trapped in refrigerators that, when
closed, could not be opened from the inside.25 Both the Flammable Fabrics Act and the
Refrigerator Safety Act were lauded as important advancements in the safeguarding of
American consumers. However, by their very nature, both acts were very limited in the
scope of their application. Ultimately, Congress concluded that this piecemeal (and,
arguably, unorganized) approach to consumer safety regulation had negatively affected
consumer safety as a whole: “the scattering of these activities in ofttimes minute
organizational units resulted in a loss of focus and commitment on the part of those
responsible.”26
As the nation proceeded into the 1960s, an increasing number of consumer
product related deaths and injuries led Congress to reexamine its product-by-product
regulatory approach. Many in Congress believed that the growing use of automated
technology as a component of many consumer products had created a very dangerous
scenario that warranted increased consumer safety regulations:
The end of World War II is a convenient point in time from which to
consider what may be called a technological revolution in home products.
Even the most modest homes today have numerous items—many of which
are potentially dangerous—which were unthought of, or at least
unattainable prior to World War II…..For the most part this is a boon and
an important contribution to an enviable progress in our society.

20

H.R. REP. NO. 91-1361, at 4 (1970).
Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (Pub. L. No. 83-88, 67 Stat. 111 (1953)).
22
S. REP. NO. 83-400 (1953). These high profile incidents included one particularly concerning case of an
individual’s sweater igniting while he was sitting in court one afternoon.
23
Pub. L. No. 90-189, 81 Stat. 568 (1967). In 1972, Congress re-assigned regulatory authority over
personal clothing and interior furnishings from the Federal Trade Commission to the newly established
CPSC. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
24
Refrigerator Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211−1214 (Pub. L. No. 84-930, 70 Stat. 953 (1956)).
25
S. REP. NO. 84-2700 (1956).
26
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1361, at 6 (1970).
21
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However, such devices and numerous others in and related to the home
too often have unwanted side effects.27
In light of this apparent concern that the use of technology in consumer products
was outpacing safety, combined with its belief that existing state, local, and industry
regulations were insufficient28, Congress decided to wholly re-examine its approach to
consumer safety regulation. In 1961, Congress took one of its first steps toward
extensively studying the issue of consumer product safety when the House Subcommittee
on Intergovernmental Relations commissioned a study entitled “Consumer Protection
Activities of the Federal Departments and Agencies.”29 This study analyzed the federal
government’s role in consumer safety activities to date and was followed the next term by
two additional subcommittee reports addressing “Consumer Protection Activities of State
Governments”.30 These studies were a precursor to a broad new Congressional effort
aimed at federalizing much of the consumer product safety field.
On November 20, 1967, Congress took a large step toward the federalization of
consumer safety regulation when it established the National Commission on Product
Safety (“NCPS”).31 This “temporary” 32 commission was charged with researching the
sufficiency and scope of the existing federal consumer product safety laws and then
transmitting a final report to the President and to the Congress within two years.33 In
particular, Congress required that the NCPS consider the following four subjects:
(1)
the identity of categories of household products, except such
products excluded in section 6, whch [sic] may present an unreasonable
hazard to the health and safety of the consuming public;
(2)
the extent to which self-regulation by industry affords such
protection;
(3)
the protection against such hazardous products afforded at
common law in the States, including the relationship of product warranty
to such protection; and
(4)
a review of Federal, State, and local laws relating to the protection
of consumers against categories of such hazardous products, including the
scope of coverage, the effectiveness of sanctions, the adequacy of
27

H.R. REP. NO. 90-882, at 1925 (1967).
Congress’ belief that a non-federal approach toward consumer safety was ineffective was demonstrated
by the finding in H.R. REP. NO. 90-882 that “[I]ndustry, local government, and State government interests
are aware of the problem and numerous regulations and statutes have been enacted , but no one has been
heard to say that there is not a real need for improvement in this area…” Id.
29
H.R. REP. NO. 87-1241(1961).
30
H.R. REP. NO. 88-445 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 88-921 (1963).
31
Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-51, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
32
“Temporary” in the sense that the express terms of Pub. L. No. 90-146 required that “[n]inety days after
submission of its final report, as provided in section 2(c), the Commission shall cease to exist.”
33
The original bill establishing the National Commission on Product Safety mandated that the commission
transmit its report within “two years from the date of approval of this joint resolution” which would have
been November 20, 1969. See Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 500 (1967). However, administrative
matters delayed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s appointment of the commission until March 27, 1968. As a
result, Congress extended the deadline for the commission’s final report until June 30, 1970. See Pub. L.
No. 91-51, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
28

10

investigatory powers, the uniformity of application, and the quality of
enforcement.34
As part of its effort, the NCPS researched hundreds of different consumer
products35—ultimately identifying in excess of 300 categories of products that remained
unregulated under the existing regulatory schemes.36 These products ranged the gamut
from children’s toys to lawn care products.37
After completing its research, the NCPS completed its charge by submitting to
Congress and the Nixon administration a final report outlining its results.38 In short, the
NCPS found the threat posed by consumer products to be “bona fide and menacing.”39
The report found that one of the primary causes of this threat was that Congress had
passed too many stand-alone consumer safety laws governing different products.40 This
created a lack of uniformity that led in turn to an unorganized and certainly less than
comprehensive approach to regulating consumer safety.41 The NCPS proposed resolving
this problem by creating an omnibus safety regulation covering nearly all consumer
products and activities.42
Moreover, the Chairman of the NCPS was adamant that this issue simply could
not be remedied through increased industry self-governance because “American industry
may lack the incentive for safety necessary to overcome what may be an irreconcilable
profit motive.”43 Therefore, “government must be its gadfly.”44
In addition to this perceived profit motive, the NCPS also concluded that an
industry-governed solution would be ineffective because “[o]nly a few of the largest
manufacturers have coherent, articulated safety engineering programs.”45 According to
the NCPS, this not only resulted in many products whose engineering standards were
dubious at best, but also resulted in sporadic manufacturer attempts to quantify consumer
injury data and establish cost-benefit analyses for safety design changes.46

34

Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 499 (1967).
The fact that the NCPS chose to examine “consumer products” as a whole is interesting since its enabling
legislation limited its mandate to “household products”—a seemingly much narrower scope of products.
The NCPS apparently decided to sua sponte expand its mandate beyond the scope of its enabling
legislation and include “consumer products” because “that term best describes our statutory mandate and
most products which are not now subject to adequate Federal safety regulation.” Hearing on National
Commission On Product Safety Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 37 (1970)(hearing and
final report presented to the President and Congress). While this decision might have been well-intentioned,
as will become evident in the next section, the NCPS’ decision to essentially re-write the scope of its
legislatively-assigned task ultimately would serve as a central issue in the litigation of whether fixed-site
amusement parks ever fell within the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission’s jurisdiction.
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The NCPS also dismissed any idea that this issue could be effectively dealt with
on the state government level:
State and local laws also demonstrate the inadequacies of existing safety
legislation. These laws, often passed in response to specific tragedy,
frequently deal with such isolated products as bedding, matches or
exploding golf balls. In addition the laws’ limited effectiveness in
protecting consumers they often present significant obstacles to
manufacturers who are forced to comply with conflicting State and local
requirements.47
According to the NCPS, the ineffectiveness of a State-governed solution48 was
compounded by the transient nature of consumer products: “[m]anufacturers of
hazardous products can make and ship out items that cannot be sold at retail in their own
community.”49 The NCPS concluded that one solution to these issues was federal
preemption in the field of consumer safety regulation because “[s]tates seldom impose
safety standards for consumer products.”50
In light of these perceived problems with an industry or State-governed solution,
the NCPS concluded that the only effective solution to consumer safety issues must be
federal in its nature: “[w]e believe that the leadership in this effort to eliminate
unreasonable hazards in the marketplace is appropriately and peculiarly a function of the
Federal Government.”51
While the NCPS was conducting its research, the Nixon administration was also
researching this issue and preparing its own proposed comprehensive approach to
regulating consumer products.52 Soon thereafter, both the NCPS and the President
submitted bills to Congress aimed at consolidating nearly all federal consumer product
safety regulation53 under the umbrella of one entity. Both bills proposed creating a
comprehensive federal consumer safety regulation with one major exception: the
Commission’s bill sought to establish a new independent regulatory agency54 while the
47

Id. at 6.
Interestingly though, the NCPS was not entirely dismissive of any State role in consumer product
regulation. In fact, in its Final Report, the NCPS concluded that:
As State[s] and municipalities traditionally have served to adapt national programs to
unusual local conditions, they have also been a source of original and innovative
techniques and ideas in legislation... [t]hey provide an indispensable channel and source
for the feedback of information about product safety and the effect of safety regulations.
Id. at 51.
49
Id. at 39.
50
Id. at 52; To be fair though, the NCPS did envision a scheme in which those “State regulations that do
not unduly burden interstate commerce ...” might be still be appropriate. Id.
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S. 1797, 92nd Cong. (1972); H.R. 8110, 92nd Cong. (1972).
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While the CPSA was often called a “comprehensive” or “omnibus” consumer safety bill, several
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and Drug Administration’s jurisdiction over consumer drugs, food, cosmetics, and medical devices (21
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President’s bill sought to vest authority in a new entity within the existing Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.55
The NCPS envisioned an independent agency that would be similar to the Federal
Trade Commission in that it would not directly report to any Department or Cabinet
office.56 It concluded that an independent agency was an absolute necessity because
“[s]tatutory regulatory programs buried in agencies with broad and diverse missions
have, with few exceptions, rarely fulfilled their mission.”57 This resulted from the fact
that non-independent agencies inherently suffer inadequate staffing and funding because
of competition for these limited resources within the umbrella agency.58
The Nixon administration, on the other hand, envisioned its proposed Consumer
Safety Administration as essentially replacing the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare’s Food and Drug Administration with three distinct “offices”, namely, the Office
of Product Safety Regulation, the Office of Food Regulation, and the Office of Drug
Regulation.59 The administration aimed to take what it called the “next logical step” in
consumer product safety regulation by establishing the “Government’s authority to take
positive action in the interests of safety, when needed, across the full range of consumer
products.”60 The administration bill provided for the promulgation of mandatory product
safety standards, authority to conduct inspections, and a private right of action
mechanism.61 In the end, the Nixon administration chose to pursue this goal through an
existing department, rather than an independent agency, because it believed that “this
important program can be most efficiently and effectively managed in a major
department [the existing HEW] which has similar and complementary programs,
supporting facilities and a high degree of visibility in the public eye.62
Ultimately, components of both approaches were melded into what was originally
termed the Food, Drug and Consumer Product Agency but soon became known as the
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S. 1797, 92nd Cong. (1972).
S. 983, 92nd Cong. (1972); H.R. 8157, 92nd Cong. (1972).
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The administration’s rationale for opposing the creation of a new independent agency was based upon the
stated need to reduce the growing proliferation of such agencies at that time:
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Those who favor an independent agency do so in hopes that this will be useful in
achieving our common goals—assuring visibility, public accountability, a quick start, and
vigor for an important new program. But this is not necessarily the best way to achieve
these ends. And it runs counter to a current need to consolidate, not proliferate, agencies.
We all know that we cannot indefinitely proliferate agencies for a multitude of special
needs. The problem of proliferation of agencies has become acute.
The Consumer Product Safety Act: Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, H.R. 260 (and additional bills),
H.R. 3813 (and additional bills) Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce. & Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92nd Cong. 974, 977 (1971).
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Id. at 977.
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Id. at 970-976.
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Commission bill is located in the Senate sub-committee hearing statement and testimony of Elliot
Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, id. at 968-1057.
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Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”).63 The underlying idea was to create a
new “super-agency” that would combine certain areas of regulatory authority previously
exercised by the Food and Drug Administration, Center for Disease Control, Department
of Commerce, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Agriculture and the former
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.64 Ultimately, Congress sought to
establish “one agency with comprehensive jurisdiction and authority to regulate all food,
drugs, and common household products.”65
The effort to establish an omnibus federal consumer safety regulation was finally
completed when Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (“CPSA”)
and President Nixon signed the bill into law.66 This Act created the CPSC, an
independent federal agency with authority to exercise safety regulatory jurisdiction over
nearly all consumer products and activities.67
3. The Crescendo of Federal Consumer Safety Regulatory Power: the
Creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
In establishing the CPSC in 1972, Congress issued a series of findings that
specifically set forth its rationale for exercising what was essentially a federal police
power over issues of consumer safety. Among other things, Congress specifically found
that the states were not adequately regulating consumer safety:
The Congress finds that
(1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which present
unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;

63

Possibly predicting these diverging approaches, legislation was at one point introduced that would have
created both an independent agency called the Consumer Protection Agency and an executive branch office
called the Office of Consumer Affairs. See H.R. 18214, 91st Cong. (1970).
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See S. REP. NO. 92-749 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4574.
65
Id. As clearly demonstrated by the Senate Commerce Committee report, the Committee contemplated
the consumer product regulatory scope of this Act in terms of “household products”. The use of this
language seems to be an early indication that non-household products, such as amusement park attractions,
were not originally envisioned as falling within the scope of this new “super-agency”. In fact, the
Committee report later reiterated the limited regulatory scope of this agency, at least in terms of consumer
products, when it stated that, “new legislative authority is also necessary to cover the safety hazards posed
by household products for which present law establishes no safety regulation.” See S. REP. NO. 92-749
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4579 (emphasis added). Thus, the argument by those in
favor of granting the CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site park attractions, that Congress created a previously
non-existent regulatory loophole for fixed-site park attractions by exempting them from the current scope
of the CPSC’s jurisdiction seems to ignore the fact that the Senate itself originally provided the Federal
government with regulatory authority only over “household products.”
66
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1208, 2051 (1972).
67
A detailed explanation of how Congress ultimately reconciled the differing approaches toward creating a
new federal entity charged with a near comprehensive regulatory responsibility over consumer products can
be found in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference for the CPSA (PL 92-573)
located at H.R. REP. NO. 92-1593, at 32-56.

14

(2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse nature and abilities
of consumers using them frequently result in an inability of users to
anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves adequately;
(3) the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products;
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products is inadequate and may be burdensome
to manufacturers;
(5) existing Federal authority to protect consumers from exposure to
consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of injury is inadequate;
and
(6) regulation of consumer products the distribution or use of which
affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to carry out this Act.68
After making these findings, Congress proceeded to identify the goals it sought to
achieve by establishing the CPSC
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated
with consumer products;
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer
products;
(3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to
minimize conflicting State and local regulations; and
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of
product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.69
The CPSA provided the CPSC with two types of enforcement tools: the ability to
promulgate mandatory product safety standards and the ability to initiate product
recalls.70 The mandatory standard provision was generally considered the more effective
of the two because it allowed the CPSC to prevent products that did not meet the
mandatory standard from even entering the marketplace.71 However, the CPSA required
that the CPSC complete a detailed rule-making process before promulgating a mandatory
standard.72 Consumers could also petition the CPSC for a specific product safety
standard.73
The recall provision, on the other hand, allowed for swift and decisive action on a
consumer product—but, by its very nature, only after the product had entered into the
marketplace. This presented the CPSC with a choice: prioritize its own efforts on the
more cumbersome mandatory standards approach of preventing dangerous consumer
68
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products from getting to market or prioritizing the less cumbersome recall approach of
removing dangerous consumer products after they had entered the market. Despite the
incredible amount of research, study, and debate that ultimately went into creating it, the
CPSC would soon find that its ability to accomplish these Congressionally-established
goals was much less certain than expected.
The first chairman of the CPSC, Richard Simpson, opted for the former approach
and went so far as to promise that the CPSC would promulgate at least 100 new
mandatory product safety standards within the CPSC’s first ten years.74 The problem this
pledge faced was that it did not fully grasp the effect of also allowing consumers, as well
as trade groups, corporations, or nearly any other type of entity, to petition the CPSC for
mandatory safety standards. This created a logjam of petitions which itself was
compounded by the fact that, soon after its first day of business, the CPSC began to
solicit petitions from consumers.75 The result was that the CPSC was quickly inundated
with an unmanageable number of safety standard petitions that distracted the
Commission from formulating any of its own product safety standards.76 In response, the
CPSC tried different measures to enable it to begin establishing its own agenda (rather
than simply responding to outside petitions); however, by 1976, Chairman Simpson
acknowledged that up to 75 percent of the CPSC’s regulatory efforts were spent
responding to petitions rather than creating its own mandatory standards or instituting its
own recalls.77 In many ways, the CPSC’s aggressive attempt to respond to outside
petitions, while still implementing its own internal safety priorities, created a “jack of all
trades but a master of none” scenario.78
Despite facing a complete overload of its resources, the CPSC would soon decide
that its regulatory scope allowed it to exercise nationwide jurisdiction over amusement
parks, including those fixed to a specific site. The CPSC made this decision despite the
fact that, near this very time, the General Accounting Office had issued several reports
and offered testimony before a Congressional oversight committee that was critical of the
CPSC’s operations, including its overextension of resources: “the Commission needs to
be selective in its enforcement and compliance activities and it certainly cannot cover the
total universe on a 100-percent basis.”79
This decision to further expand its regulatory reach would only end up
exacerbating the CPSC’s problems as it would now mean that the CPSC would have to
travel throughout country inspecting the growing number of fixed-site amusement parks
sprouting up from Los Angeles to Long Island—and all parts in between since, unlike
household products (or, for that matter, nearly all other products that it regulated), fixed74
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site amusement attractions could not be packaged up and shipped to a central CPSC
testing facility for inspection and analysis. By deciding to begin regulating fixed-site
attractions, the CPSC would end up raising serious legal questions of not only could the it
legally regulate such attractions but, in light of its limited budget and staffing, should it
do so. The stage was now set for the regulatory showdown over fixed-site attractions.
C. The Birth and Development of Fixed-Site Amusement Parks in the United
States.
In 1894, what is generally considered the first modern day amusement park,
“Water Chutes”, opened in Chicago. In addition to being the first park to charge
admission, Water Chutes was also the first park to use amusement rides as its primary
guest attraction. The success of Water Chutes ultimately led to the opening of the famous
Coney Island amusement park in New York. Soon, this new form of entertainment found
its way into communities throughout the country.80 In fact, by 1910, over 2000
amusement parks were being operated within the United States.81
The number of amusement parks continued to gradually grow throughout the
early 20th century with one historian identifying the 1920s as “the golden age of
amusement parks.”82 However, by the end of that decade, the Great Depression had
struck and the number of amusement parks had dwindled to around 400.83 The industry
would make a comeback, however, because of the prosperity that many Americans
encountered following World War II.84 This comeback too faced challenges though as
more and more American families moved away from the cities--where many amusement
parks were located--and into the suburbs. While doing so, many of these families also
began to find their main source of entertainment at home following their purchase of that
new innovation known as the television.85
On July 17, 1955, a pivotal event in the history of amusement parks occurred with
the opening of Disneyland in Anaheim, California. Costing upwards of $17 million,
Disneyland was designed as a variation of the traditional amusement park that had, until
now, been centered around a midway.86 Instead of adhering to that traditional layout,
Disneyland was centered around five “themed” lands—thus the creation of the term
“theme park”. In addition to being designed differently than any amusement park at the
time, Disneyland also placed a unique emphasis on “ride safety” as being one of the key
components to a successful park. As one commentator has noted, “Disney saw his park
80
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as the future of entertainment and even as a model of cities to come: clean, efficient, safe,
and controlled.”87
The incredible success of Disneyland ultimately led to large corporations such as
Marriott Corporation, Anheuser-Busch, and Mattel entering the theme park field.88 This
boom continued through the 1970s with the opening of Disney World in Orlando, Florida
and into the 1980s and 1990s with the openings of various Sea World, Universal, and Six
Flags theme parks as well as Epcot Center in Orlando, Florida—the first park to be built
at a cost of over $1 billion dollars.89
In 2003, over 165 million people attended just the top fifty most-visited parks in
the United States.90 In total, there are approximately 600 amusement and theme parks
located in the United States.91 Not surprisingly, with this incredible growth, has come
increased scrutiny. In particular, a growing number of consumers, regulators, media, and
researchers have increasingly asked the question: are the products of this industry that so
many Americans enjoy every year really safe?
The answer to this question serves as the crux of the debate regarding whether the
federal government or the state governments should regulate the safety of fixed-site
amusement and theme parks. In fact, not long after the passage of the CPSA, the CPSC
appeared to offer its own answer to this question when it attempted to usurp the
traditional state authority over this regulatory area. What followed was a debate that
continues today, full of legal and legislative wranglings.
D. The CPSC’s Attempt at Exercising Safety Regulatory Jurisdiction Over
Fixed-site attractions.
[Police Powers] form a portion of that immense mass of
legislation which embraces everything within the territory
of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all
which can be most advantageously exercised by the States
themselves.92
Traditionally, the CPSC has taken a very expansionist view regarding the scope of
its regulatory authority to the point that it now regulates over 15,000 different products.93
When it comes to fixed-site amusement attractions, however, the CPSC has not always
87
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been absolutely certain that these attractions fell within its regulatory jurisdiction. In
fact, a review of internal CPSC documents from the mid 1970s reveals that the CPSC’s
very first steps into this area were trepiditious at best.
1. The CPSC’s Initial Steps Toward Exercising Jurisdiction Over Fixed-Site
Amusement Parks.
One of the first documented internal CPSC discussions of this issue occurred in
August 1974 when Robert W. McAfee, Acting Area Director for the CPSC’s Denver
Area Office wrote to the CPSC’s Office of Field Coordination Director, Charles Boehne,
inquiring whether amusement park rides actually fell within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.94
Less than ten days later, Mr. Boehne forwarded a memorandum with his office’s initial
thoughts on Mr. McAfee’s inquiry to the CPSC General Counsel’s Office. In this
memorandum Mr. Boehne indicated that his office felt that strong arguments could be
made both in favor of and against the CPSC asserting jurisdiction over amusement rides:
Dave Wolfson tells me there is a clear case to argue against jurisdiction on
the theory of assumption of risk.95 On the other side of the coin, we could
say that the consumer is purchasing the ride, and the ride itself represents a
consumer product; therefore the ride is subject to our jurisdiction. From
this position, we could argue that, as a consumer product, the ride would
be subject to our jurisdiction if it presented an unreasonable source of risk
to the consumer.96
In November of that same year, the CPSC General Counsel Office issued a
memorandum in which it concluded that “amusement rides fall within the jurisdiction of
the Commission, and are subject to regulation under the Consumer Product Safety Act.”
97
The OGC relied upon Section 3 (a)(1) of the CPSA which defined consumer products
as: “any article or component part thereof, produced or distributed … (ii) for the personal
94
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use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise …”
Based upon this definition, the General Counsel’s Office reasoned that “[i]t can
be said that consumers ‘use’ amusement rides when they ride on them … Since that use is
considered ‘recreation’, amusement rides fall within the above statutory definition.”98
Interestingly, neither Mr. McAfee’s original letter nor Mr. Boehne’s subsequent
memorandum—nor even the November response memorandum from the Commission’s
General Counsel’s Office—made any distinction between whether the amusement rides
were located in fixed-site parks or mobile parks. Whether these individuals simply did
not understand the potential significance of this distinction is unclear. It does, however,
seem to indicate that all of these individuals, including the Commission’s legal counsel,
were evaluating this issue within the context of statutory interpretation rather than a
Constitutional question involving interstate commerce.99
2. The CPSC’s Initial Enforcement Actions
The CPSC’s internal conclusion that it maintained regulatory jurisdiction over
amusement park rides was soon followed by the its first lawsuit seeking to enjoin the
operation of a specific ride. In CPSC v. Chance Manufacturing Co., Inc.100, the CPSC
sued the manufacturer and distributor of the “Zipper”—an amusement ride in which
guests were placed in vehicles seating two or three persons and then rotated on a 360
degree arc.101 This lawsuit was preceded by a news release from the CPSC which
contained an “urgent warning” for consumers to avoid riding the Zipper following four
fatalities and two serious injuries suffered after a door latch allegedly malfunctioned
causing riders to be ejected from the ride vehicle.102
In the lawsuit, the CPSC first alleged that the Zipper was a consumer product
subject to its regulatory jurisdiction.103 The CPSC then alleged that the operation of this
consumer product should be enjoined because it constituted an “imminently hazardous
consumer product” which, pursuant to Section 12(b)(1) of the CPSA was subject to
temporary and permanent relief (in this case the CPSC sought a preliminary
injunction).104 The manufacturer of the Zipper and the defendant responded by seeking
the dismissal of the lawsuit on the ground that the Zipper did not fall within the definition
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of a “consumer product” under the CPSA and, therefore, did not fall within the CPSC’s
jurisdiction.105
While recognizing the “closeness” of the issue and that its decision rested on
“narrow grounds”, the court ultimately held that the Zipper was a “consumer product”
and thus subject to CPSC jurisdiction.106 In making this decision, the court looked to the
CPSC’s definition of “consumer product”:
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale
to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or
temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise
...107
After reviewing this definition, the court agreed that the Zipper did not fall within
Part (i) of the same definition since the ride was not sold directly to consumers.108
However, contrary to the defendant’s primary argument, the court found that the Zipper
did fall within Part (ii) of the definition because it was produced and distributed for the
personal use and enjoyment of the consumer in recreation.109 Notably, because it
concluded that the “consumer product” definition itself was ambiguous, the court opted
to rely upon its interpretation of various legislative history sources as a basis for this
finding.110 In particular, the court found especially persuasive the fact that: “[t]he most
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to be gleaned from the legislative history
of the Act is that the definition of “consumer product” be construed broadly to advance
the Act’s articulated purpose of protecting consumers from hazardous products.”111
From here, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Zipper could not
be a “consumer product” because the rider had no possessory interest over the ride and,
instead, maintained at most “an abstract right to occupy an amusement device.”112 In
other words, the defendant essentially argued that a product could only be a consumer
product if the consumer could maintain some control over the product. However, the
court found that this element of “control” was not actually required by the definition at
issue and, in making this finding, ultimately concluded that “personal use, consumption
or enjoyment” can exist absent any control or possession by the consumer.113
Essentially, the Chance matter revolved around the issue of statutory
interpretation and did not address the legal appropriateness of the statute itself. In fact,
not a single word of dicta is given to the issue of whether the federal government even
had a right to regulate products, such as amusement rides, that had traditionally been
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governed by the states—this despite the fact that the issue of what fell within the scope of
the Commerce Clause remained a pressing discussion among the courts at the time.114
The fact that neither the defendant nor the court even considered the interstate
commerce implications of federalizing amusement park safety regulations seems further
indicative of the fact that the federal right to regulate this area is not contingent or based
upon the Commerce Clause. Rather, the federal government’s ability to enter this field of
regulation could be premised on the fact that, as a sovereign governmental entity (like the
states), it too possesses an inherent right to protect the safety of its citizens through police
powers.115 Regardless of the answer to the question of whether the federal government
does maintain an inherent police power, even if the defendant had prevailed in Chance,
the victory could have been short-lived as Congress could simply have chosen to revise
the definition of “consumer product” to include amusement rides.
As the following discussion on the current legislative efforts to federalize fixedsite amusement park safety regulation will show, this point is very important because it
helps clarify that the real underlying issue is not whether the federal government can
regulate amusement rides but whether it should do so (or, conversely, whether it should
yield to the states on this issue). In the case of amusement rides, the facts clearly
demonstrate that the CPSC ignored the propriety of its entering this regulatory field and,
instead, opted to bull-headedly charge into this matter with little, if any, consideration
about the effects—or even the need—for it to do so.
Apparently emboldened by its relative success in the Chance matter, the CPSC
quickly entered into a series of additional lawsuits in its increased efforts to regulate
amusement rides. One such example was the CPSC’s announcement on August 29, 1980
that it had contemporaneously filed a formal complaint against the State Fair of Texas
arising from a fatal accident on that park’s “Skyride” as well as two other complaints
against the Marriott Corporation relating to two of its “Great America” parks located in
Santa Clara, California and Gurnee, Illinois.116 The CPSC’s simultaneous filing of these
complaints represented the largest regulatory effort to date against fixed-site attractions
and set the stage for the political and legal fights that would finally answer the question
of whether the CPSA provided the CPSC with regulatory authority over amusement
attractions in fixed-site parks.
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The allegations against Marriott involved a roller-coaster operating under the
name of “Willard’s Whizzer”.117 In particular, the CPSC alleged that Marriott failed to
report several incidents in which the braking mechanism on this ride failed to properly
engage, thus causing serious rider injuries—including an incident on March 29, 1980 in
which a thirteen-year-old child was killed on the ride at Marriott’s Santa Clara park.118
In The State Fair of Texas v. United States Consumer Products Safety
Commission,119 the plaintiff sought to quash an administrative warrant by the CPSC
seeking to inspect the “Swiss Skyride”120 located at the Texas State Fair. The CPSC
sought the warrant following two separate accidents involving the Swiss Skyride in
which several of the gondolas collided, resulting in various injuries and the death of one
person.121
In determining whether or not to quash the warrant, the trial court identified two
issues which must first be answered: 1) was the Swiss Skyride a “consumer product” and
2) if so, did the CPSC have authority to inspect the Swiss Skyride located on the premises
of the Texas State Fair?122 As to the first issue, the court looked to the Chance decision
as support in holding that the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product” because it was
produced for the “personal use, consumption and enjoyment” of consumers.123 The court
relied upon either legislative history or its own statutory interpretation to dismiss the
Texas State Fair’s following five primary arguments offered against defining the Swiss
Skyride as a consumer product:
1.
The Swiss Skyride was not intended as a form of consumer
recreation or enjoyment;124
2.
The definition of “consumer product” only includes household
products and, by its very size and nature, the Swiss Skyride is not a
household product;125
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3.
The definition of “consumer product” requires the consumer to
have a level of “personal” control over a product for it to fall within said
definition;126
4.
The Swiss Skyride is not a “consumer product” because it is not
sold directly to consumers;127
5.
The definition of “consumer product” requires that the CPSC be
able to obtain a free “sample” of a product or purchase a product at cost—
neither of which requirements are practicable for the Swiss Skyride.128
After concluding that the Swiss Skyride was indeed a “consumer product”, the
court considered whether the CPSA authorized the CPSC to enter the state fairgrounds to
inspect the Swiss Skyride located there. On this issue, the court concluded that the CPSC
had not yet satisfied the statutory requirements necessary in order to obtain a warrant to
enter the Texas State Fair property.129 The court based this ruling on the fact that
Section 2065(a) of the CPSA limits the CPSC inspection jurisdiction to “any factory,
warehouse, or establishment in which consumer products are manufactured or held, in
connection with distribution in commerce.”130 In light of this requirement, the court
concluded that the CPSC had not established that the Texas State Fair fell within the
scope of these limits and, therefore, the CPSC could not enter and inspect because the
“multitudinous facets of the right to be let alone are not merely classroom ideals but are
core constitutional concepts.”131
The end result was that the trial court agreed with the CPSC that the Swiss
Skyride was a “consumer product” but disagreed that the CPSC had the authority to enter
the state fairgrounds to inspect this consumer product. Unfortunately for the Texas State
Fair, this “procedural” victory was to be short-lived as the Fifth Circuit would soon
demonstrate.
Both sides appealed the trial court’s judgment; the Texas State Fair appealed the
ruling that the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product” and the CPSC appealed the
ruling that it did not have authority to enter the state fairgrounds to inspect the Swiss
Skyride.132 In a split decision, the majority upheld the trial court’s ruling that the Swiss
Skyride was a “consumer product” and overturned the trial court’s ruling that the CPSC
had not established any basis by which it was authorized to enter the state fairgrounds to
inspect the Swiss Skyride.133 In particular, the circuit court found that the trial court’s
126
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interpretation of where a consumer product could be inspected was too narrow because
the Skyride was indeed “assembled” at the Texas State Fair.134 The court based this
finding on what it perceived to be the impractical consequences of the trial court’s ruling:
“[w]henever a product can be assembled only on the purchaser’s site, the Commission
must either have the authority to inspect the functioning product there or be in most
circumstances unable to inspect it at all.”135
On the issue of whether the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product”, the
majority opinion essentially adopted the reasoning of the trial court in rejecting the Texas
State Fair’s arguments. The result is that, like Chance, this case was ultimately decided
by statutory interpretation and legislative histories findings. In other words, the parties
continued to approach the issue from an angle of “can the CPSC” instead of “should the
CPSC”.136 While the Chance and State Fair of Texas decisions seemed to demonstrate a
trend toward defining amusement rides as “consumer products”, two other cases were
working themselves through the courts and would ultimately hold just the opposite.
On April 17, 1979—roughly eight months before the trial court’s ruling in the
State Fair of Texas case—a federal court in California issued the first opinion holding
that amusement rides did not fall within in the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”.
Walt Disney Productions v. United States CPSC137 also involved an attempt by the CPSC
to inspect other Skyride-like attractions—in this case at the Disneyland park in Anaheim,
California and at the Walt Disney World park in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. This dispute
began, on December 5, 1978, when the CPSC sent letters to Disney announcing that it
was opening an investigation into Skyrides and that Disney must provide the CPSC
certain information regarding its Skyrides pursuant to this investigation.138
In response to these letters, Disney sought declaratory relief from the court in the
form of a judgment that these Skyrides did not fall within the CPSA’s definition of
“consumer product”. The court granted such relief after concluding that the rides at
issue are not “consumer products” because “the Act and its history supports an
interpretation limiting the term ‘consumer product’ to products that might customarily be
owned and/or operated by consumers.”139 In particular, the court concluded that:
When a customer at Disneyland or Walt Disney World purchases a ride on
a Skyride, he or she purchases only the right to occupy the installation
134
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passively. The only ‘consumer product’ purchased is the [ride] ticket.
The ride apparatus as a whole is not produced ‘for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer...so it is not a consumer
product.140
As part of this holding, the court deftly addressed not only whether the CPSC can
regulate amusement rides, but also whether it should: “[t]oo expansive a reading of the
Act’s definition of a ‘consumer product’ could result in the Commission spreading [its]
limited resources too thinly, and might rob consumers of the specialized agency expertise
that Congress has attempted to guarantee.141
While this decision was ultimately reversed on other grounds142, this ruling
provided an important glimpse into the critical question of whether the CPSC’s entry into
the field of amusement park safety regulation might actually end up decreasing overall
safety in the amusement industry by replacing existing state regulatory mechanisms with
the CPSC’s nascent fixed-site attraction regulatory effort. Notably, the Disney case was
not the only decision to conclude that amusement rides were not “consumer products”
though. In fact, early the next year, a decision would be issued which would ultimately
place two federal circuits at odds on this matter.
In Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,143 an
amusement park operator again brought an action for declaratory relief against the CPSC
following the Commission’s attempt to obtain information concerning another skyridetype attraction—this time located at the Tulsa, Oklahoma State Fairgrounds.144 The
declaratory relief action sought a judgment that the CPSC did not have jurisdiction over
amusement rides at the Oklahoma State Fair.145 Similar to the plaintiffs in the State Fair
of Texas and Disney matters, the plaintiff in this case argued that the skyride at issue did
not fall within the definition of “consumer product” and, in doing so, basically adopted
the same arguments relied upon by the plaintiff in State Fair of Texas matter.146
And, just as the Bell plaintiff used similar arguments as the State Fair of Texas
plaintiff, the trial court in Bell reached a similar conclusion as the trial court in State Fair
of Texas when it concluded that the skyride at issue did indeed fall within the definition
of “consumer product”.147 In opting to agree with the State Fair of Texas court rather
than the Disney court, this court noted the “minimal consideration of legislative history in
Disney compared to that in Chance” and, as a result, decided that: “this Court will follow
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the apparently more thoroughly researched and better-reasoned decision in Chance,
supported by the decision in State Fair.”148
However, the similarity between the trial courts’ findings in Bell and State Fair of
Texas, did not extend to the appellate courts’ conclusions in those matters. Where the
Fifth Circuit agreed with its trial court that an amusement attraction fell within the
CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”, the Tenth Circuit overturned the Bell trial
court’s ruling of the same.149
Up until then, all of the decisions on this issue had agreed that amusement rides
did not fall within the scope of the CPSA’s subsection (i) definition of “consumer
product” because the Skyrides were obviously not produced or distributed “for sale” to
consumers as is required by that subsection.150 The primary debate was whether the same
rides fell within subsection (ii)’s “for personal use” language. Until the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in Bell, the courts appeared to make the assumption that the purpose of
subsection (ii) was to enlarge the scope of what products constituted “consumer
products”. In Bell, the Tenth Circuit rejected that conclusion.
Instead, the Tenth Circuit concluded that subsection (ii) was created only to
ensure that all manners of product distribution were covered by the CPSA--beyond
simply Section (i)’s inclusion of products that were sold to consumers.151 Thus,
subsection (ii) served the purpose of also including within the CPSA products that were
leased to consumer, given as samples to consumers, or otherwise provided to consumers
by means different from a sale and consumer purchase:
Then with the concern over distribution to consumers of articles as free
samples, on approval, on lease, on loan, etc., the second clause (ii) was
added. This was added to include distribution to consumers of the same
things but without a sale, and thereby to include articles produced or
distributed ‘for personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer.’
This with (i) was to cover all types of distribution.152
The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that subsection (ii) “was added to cover all
manner of distribution and for this alone,”153 led to its holding that amusement attractions
did not fall within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product” and, therefore, did not
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fall within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.154 The result of this decision was that the Fifth
Circuit and Tenth Circuit had now issued conflicting opinions (both of which were
majority 2 to 1 decisions) regarding the identical issue (whether an amusement ride falls
within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”) and, remarkably, involving the
same type of amusement ride (a gondola-like skyride) located at similar venues (state
fairgrounds). Obviously, this matter was ripe for Supreme Court review and, indeed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in State Fair of Texas.155
However, this hardly constituted a “traditional” grant of certiorari for, in the very
same order, the Court also vacated the State Fair of Texas judgment and remanded the
entire matter back to the trial court “with directions to dismiss as moot.”156 What caused
this strange procedural posture where a case was simultaneously granted certiorari and
mooted? The simple answer is: a 1981 Congressional amendment to the CPSA that
occurred during the very pendency of this appeal and that finally answered the issue of
whether amusement attractions fall within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”.
Quite simply, rather than let the judicial branch attempt to divine the scope of the CPSA’s
“consumer product” definition, the 1981 amendment swiftly and precisely clarified that
amusement attractions located at fixed sites do not fall within the CPSC’s jurisdiction
and, thus, are not subject to regulation or inspection by it.157 However, while this
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amendment promptly mooted the legal disputes over this issue, it hardly created peace in
the valley. In fact, the fervor enveloping these legal disputes would pale in comparison
to the legislative and political uproar that this amendment would end up causing in
Congress.
3. 1981 Amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Act
As with other agencies, Congress must periodically reauthorize the CPSC in order
to continue its existence. The decision to reauthorize an agency is generally preceded by
hearings regarding the continued necessity and viability of that agency. While these
hearings are often replete with hard questions and the occasioned political grandstanding,
the vast majority normally result in Congress reauthorizing the agency. However,
normality was nearly the exception in 1981 when the CPSC, faced with criticism from
industry and consumer groups alike came within one vote before the Health and
Environment Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce of being
effectively abolished as an independent agency.
One of the major resulting changes was that Congress implemented several new
procedures that forced the CPSC to, among other things, work with industries to establish
voluntary standards before it promulgated mandatory standards.158 Another less
comprehensive, but equally notable, change was the clarification that amusement rides at
fixed-site theme parks did not fall within the CPSC’s regulatory jurisdiction.159 These
changes would allow states to exercise their traditional police power over safety issues
while simultaneously allowing the CPSC to conserve the funds and manpower that would
have been necessary for a nationwide regulatory effort of fixed-site amusement parks.160
While it survived the 1981 oversight hearings, the CPSC’s budget was cut 26
percent and required to enact certain reforms.161 In addition to the large budget cut, one
of the major 1981 Congressional mandates was a required focus on voluntary, rather than
mandatory, standards.162 The result of these reforms was: “to require the Commission to
Finally, as recently as 1999, the CPSC issued a safety bulletin for the “Himalaya” amusement ride.
See Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC, Reverchon Industries
Announce Repair Program for Himalaya Amusement Rides (Mar. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml99/99083.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). This bulletin arose
out of a series of incidents on this ride, including one in which three riders in Austin, Texas were ejected
from their ride vehicle resulting in two serious injuries and one death. As with the “Monster” bulletin, the
CPSC exercised its jurisdiction over mobile versions of the ride and also notified state safety inspectors of
this potential problem with fixed-site versions.
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rely more on industry self-regulation to eliminate needless overregulation and to take a
closer look at its regulatory priorities in deciding how best to carry out its statutory
mandate.”163
In order to accomplish the Congressional mandates of the 1981 Amendment, the
CPSC recognized that, based upon its reduced funding and manpower, it must “manage
[its] resources more efficiently” and place “an increased emphasis on cooperation among
government, industry, and consumers.”164 To do so, the CPSC would have to
dramatically revise its method of operation. Among other things, these changes included
an elimination of the Directorate of Field Operations, a reduction of field offices from 13
to 5, and an overall reduction in travel funds.165
These internal changes not only a reduced the CPSC’s operating expenses, they
also highlighted the practicality of another reform initiated by the 1981 Amendment: the
clarification that fixed-site amusement parks were not included within the CPSA’s
definition of “consumer product”.166 The goal of this reform was to encourage states to
“assume greater responsibility for the safety of amusement rides located at permanent
sites.167 At first glance, the proposition of keeping fixed-site amusement attraction
regulation within the states’ province seemed like a strong idea because of the practical
budgetary problems faced by the CPSC as well as the theoretical federalism issues
involved in the federal government usurping an area of traditional police power.
However, as with many things, looks can be either deceiving or, at least, perceived to be
deceiving. Such was the case as this issue entered the often-curious world of
Congressional debate.
4. The Continued Battles in Congress Over the 1981 Amendment: 1983-1988

Many witnesses testified that the Commission has failed to encourage or support
voluntary efforts by industry members to improve product safety. In addition, many
believe that the Commission has overused mandatory product safety standards and bans
as compared with less intrusive alternatives such as voluntary industry standards and
requirements for warning labels or instructional materials for consumer information.
Id. at 2. The result of this insufficient response was Congress’ inclusion in the 1981
Amendment language that required the CPSC to first rely upon voluntary product
standards when practicably possible. See infra note 158.
163
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Despite the passage of the 1981 Amendment, some legislators still felt strongly
that Congress should assign regulatory authority over fixed-site amusement parks to the
CPSC. As a result, beginning with the very next session, Congressmen introduced a
number of bills with the intent of accomplishing that goal.
a. 1983—1988
The ink on the 1981 Amendment had hardly had time to dry by the time several
Congressman introduced a new bill titled the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1983.
This bill sought in part to provide the CPSC with regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site
amusement parks.168 While not allowing the CPSC to utilize all of its statutory tools
(such as the promulgation of mandatory product standards) in regulating fixed-site
attractions, this bill did seek to permit the CPSC to 1) collect amusement ride
information, 2) investigate amusement ride accidents, and 3) order corrective actions for
certain amusement rides.169
As grounds for this quick reversal of the 1981 Amendment, the bill’s proponents
argued that the states had not adequately acted to institute amusement park safety laws in
light of the 1981 Amendment.170 Moreover, even in those states that had promulgated
fixed-site attraction safety regulations, those regulations were “uneven and
inconsistent.”171 The bill’s proponents went so far as to claim that:
[t]he committee has reviewed the agency’s technical capability to assume
this task and believes it has the technical expertise necessary to discharge
the responsibilities authorized by this section. [The] CPSC has a technical
staff with expertise in the fields of mechanical, electrical and structural
engineering and a staff of field personnel trained in investigative
procedures.172
In fact, the supporters of the bill went even farther and suggested that the CPSC
should also carefully monitor the State’s own amusement park safety enforcement
efforts.173 Somewhat curiously though, the bill’s proponents expected the CPSC to do all
of this despite the fact that the CPSC had just eliminated half of its field offices addition
to drastically cutting its travel funding and budget in general.
This apparent contradiction did not fall on deaf ears in Congress. In fact, the
House Report on this bill contains the views of several Congressman who recognized the
financial imprudence of giving an agency such as the CPSC, which had just undergone
severe budget cuts, even more regulatory responsibility.174 The impractical and illprepared nature of this immediate attempt to rescind the 1981 Amendment on this issue
was summarized by the dissenting views to this bill:
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This amendment, unwisely in our view, reverses action taken by Congress
in 1981 denying the CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement parks.
At that time, Congress was persuaded that the States can sufficiently
regulate such parks and that the Commission is ill-equipped to so regulate.
We are unaware of any facts that have occurred in the last 2 years which
would lead us to conclude that a change in the present law is warranted.175
While the bill did pass out of committee, the committee’s dissenting view
ultimately prevailed and the bill was defeated. However, the effort to reverse the 1981
Amendment would not end with that defeat for, on June 6, 1984 Representative Paul
Simon of Illinois introduced the Amusement Park Safety Act of 1984.176 This bill sought
to permit (but not require) the CPSC to inspect fixed-site amusement parks in states
without existing regulations or, in the case of a fatality or personal injury requiring
hospitalization, any state regardless of whether it had legislation in place.
Representative Simon’s interest in this issue was piqued following several
amusement park incidents at parks located in Illinois, including a May 22, 1984 incident
at the Great America amusement park in Gurnee, Illinois where three riders were injured
after falling 60 feet to the ground while their ride vehicle was ascending the attraction.177
This bill passed the House of Representatives but failed to pass out of committee in the
Senate.178 Later that year, Congressman Simon was elected to one of Illinois’ United
States Senate seats. And, with him to the Senate, went his efforts to federalize fixed-site
amusement park safety regulation.
On March 20, 1985, now-Senator Paul Simon introduced the Amusement Park
Safety Act.179 This bill, supported by three of the major consumer groups at the time180,
sought to empower the CPSC to regulate fixed site amusement parks in those states (26 at
the time181) that had not passed state regulations.182 This bill also sought to grant the
CPSC authority to investigate any serious accident or fatality—again regardless of
whether the state in which the incident occurred had passed legislation governing fixedsite amusement parks.183 In essence, this bill created a dual system where states would
have the first opportunity to enact safety regulations and, if they chose not to do so, then
the federal government would then assume that responsibility: “[f]or those States that
have no regulation, the Simon [bill] would authorize the Consumer Protection Safety
175
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Commission to inspect rides. If a State like New Jersey maintains a system for
inspection, that system would not be preempted.184
The argument for this approach was similar to the previous arguments that the
federal government must get involved because too many states had still failed to pass
fixed-site attraction safety regulations and, many of those that did, lacked sufficient
uniformity to ensure a consistent level of public safety: “[s]ome 26 states have no
amusement-ride legislation or regulation; and there are wide variations in the 24 states
which do have regulations.”185
While this approach was a marked change from the initial post-1981 efforts to
grant the CPSC exclusive safety governance over fixed-site attractions, both the Reagan
administration and the CPSC opposed this bill.186 The CPSC’s opposition was based on
the fact that it did not have the budget, expertise, or manpower to do what this bill sought
to do:
The Consumer Product Safety Commission and the administration oppose
the Simon [bill]. The Consumer Product Safety Commission takes the
position that it has other matters on its agenda of things that it thinks it
should be doing, which it believes should take priority. It says that it does
not have the manpower and it does not have the funds to undertake an
inspection service for all the fixed-ride programs in the country.187
Not only did the CPSC oppose this approach, but it was also opposed by the
amusement industry. As an alternative, the amusement industry had decided to support a
different approach—in this case, Senator John Danforth’s Amusement Ride Safety
Commission Act.188 Under Senator Danforth’s amendment, rather than specifically
deciding which level of government should regulate the safety of fixed-site attractions,
Congress would establish a five-person commission charged with conducting an 18
month study of this issue and, upon its conclusion, preparing a final report for
Congress.189 The amendment also provided that, in the interim, the Commerce
Department’s National Bureau of Standards would have the power to investigate serious
accidents at fixed-site attractions if the State or local government where the accident
occurred requested such assistance.190
This approach was patterned after the original NCPS bill which too provided for a
study committee and final report on the issue of consumer safety regulation. The
rationale for this approach was two-pronged. First, this approach would cost less than
Senator Simon’s bill and did not force the CPSC to regulate an area of consumer safety
the agency itself was on record as saying that it did not have the funds or expertise to
effectively do so. Second, the supporters of this approach adopted a classic states’ rights
argument to bolster their position: “[w]here possible...where feasible, should not our
184
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basic predisposition in Congress be that regulation should be done at the local level and
at the State level if it can be effectively done at that place?”191
After much debate on the propriety of these two approaches and a flurry of
proposed amendments from both sides, both Senator Simon’s bill and Senator Danforth’s
amendment ended up failing to pass out of Senate committee during that session.192 This
mirrored the result in the House of Representatives where a similar debate between these
two approaches had ensued and where neither approach obtained enough support to pass
the entire House.193
Rather than passing on, however, the issue returned again to Congress during the
next session when Representative Waxman re-introduced the Amusement Park Safety
Act on October 1, 1987.194 This bill followed an approach similar to his earlier 1985 bill
in that it sought to provide the CPSC limited jurisdiction and regulatory powers over
fixed-site amusement parks:
The Commission and its enforcement staff will not be permitted to
conduct routine inspections of amusement park rides in states which have
passed inspection laws. The only time [the] CPSC could inspect an
amusement ride in such states would be following an accident on an
amusement park ride which involved a fatality or personal injury requiring
hospitalization....the CPSC would be prohibited from issuing industrywide
product safety standards or banning an amusement ride.195
By now, however, the moment seemed to have passed for expanding the CPSC’s
jurisdiction to include fixed-site amusement parks and, thus, the bill failed to even pass
out of committee. No additional bills to reverse the 1981 Amendment were introduced
during the remainder of the session.
b. 1989-1990
The next session of Congress brought another effort to expand the CPSC’s
regulatory jurisdiction to fixed-site amusement parks. This effort commenced on January
31, 1989 when Representative Frank Guarini introduced the Amusement Parks Safety
Act.196 This bill was broader than the previously introduced legislation on this issue in
that it did not limit the CPSC’s jurisdiction to just those states without existing fixed-site
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attraction safety regulations. Instead, the bill sought to allow the CPSC to inspect all
amusement devices “at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner.”197
While this bill was never passed out of committee, the limited CPSC jurisdiction
approach previously advocated by Representative Waxman was re-introduced during the
same session as part of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 1989—a bill
which dealt with a variety of CPSC governance issues in addition to fixed-site attraction
safety regulation.198 However, following a series of legislative maneuvers where this bill
was, at several different stages: a) combined with another bill; b) tabled; and, c) then reconsidered as part of another Senate bill, the part of the bill that assigned fixed-site
attraction jurisdiction to the CPSC was ultimately removed from the final conference
report in order to secure passage of other portions of the bill (including, most notably, the
federal regulation of All Terrain Vehicles—a topic that was quickly replacing amusement
parks as public safety enemy #1 in the eyes of many legislators and consumer groups).199
This removal concluded a tumultuous ten-year debate on this issue which at least one
legislator termed the CPSC’s “difficult decade”.200 Following this defeat, the issue then
disappeared from Congress for nearly an entire decade.
c. 1991-2004
From 1991 through 1998, the supporters of reversing the 1981 Amendment and
providing the CPSC with regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions appeared to be
on hiatus, with very little legislative discussion being directed toward the issue. In 1999,
however, this highly controversial issue was revisited for the first time in nearly a decade
when Representative Edward Markey from Massachusetts led a renewed effort to grant
the CPSC regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions by introducing the National
Amusement Safety Act of 1999.201
Representative Markey introduced this bill following a series of amusement park
fatalities during the last week of August 1999. During that week—one which a leading
national magazine termed “one of the most calamitous weeks in the history of America’s
amusement parks”202—a 12-year-old child died after falling through a harness on a ride a
Great America’s Santa Clara park and a 20-year-old man, as well as a 39-year-old
woman and her 8-year-old daughter, died on roller coasters at Paramount’s King’s
Dominion Park in Virginia and Gillian’s Wonderland Pier park in New Jersey
respectively.203 While admitting that “roller coasters are, in general, quite safe”,
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Representative Markey concluded that the potentially “catastrophic” consequences of
amusement parks without federal regulation outweighed any existing safety record.204
Notably, this short, one page bill eschewed the previous 1980s attempts by
Senator Simon and others to divide regulatory responsibilities between the states and the
federal government and, instead, sought to empower the federal government with near
exclusive regulatory authority over fixed-site attractions by closing what Representative
Markey was calling the 1981 “Rollercoaster Loophole”205:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act
of 1999’.
SEC. 2. JURISDICTION OVER FIXED SITE AMUSEMENT RIDES.
Section 3(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2052(1)) is
amended-(1) in the second sentence, by striking ‘, and which is not permanently
fixed to a site’; and
(2) by striking the third sentence.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission $500,000 for each fiscal year to enable the Commission to
carry out the Consumer Product Safety Act as amended by section 2.206
As opposed to the extensive efforts of the Simon approach or the Danforth
approach during the 1980s to federally address the issue of fixed-site attraction safety, the
Markey approach essentially did nothing more than specifically repeal the 1981
Amendment concerning fixed-site attractions. In other words, the Markey bill simply
sought to restore the 1981 status quo. Considering that the status quo was that two circuit
courts had disagreed whether fixed-site attractions fell within the CPSC’s definition of
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“consumer product” and that the United States Supreme Court had not yet finally
resolved that disagreement among the circuit courts, the reality of this approach was that
it simply restored the pending litigation regarding what activities or products fell within
the definition of “consumer product” under the CPSA.
On May 16, 2000, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection held an extensive hearing on this issue.207 During this hearing,
representatives from both industry groups and consumer groups, as well as personnel
from the CPSC, offered testimony on this issue.208 Predictably, the testimony cut along
lines with the amusement industry opposed to the Markey bill and consumer groups
supporting it. Ultimately, the bill died in committee during that session.
However, as was the case in the early 1980s, the proponents of this effort would
not go quietly. On April 4, 2001, Representative Markey re-introduced the National
Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 2001.209 This bill was essentially the same as the
Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 1999 in that it sought to rescind the 1981
amendment and appropriate $500,000 to the CPSC to regulate fixed-site attractions.
Notably, this bill did differ from the 1999 legislation in that the 1999 bill had 52
cosponsors and received a full subcommittee hearing while the 2001 bill could garner
only 19 cosponsors and did not receive a subcommittee hearing.210 Ultimately, the one
major trait that the 2001 bill had most in common with the 1999 bill was that it also died
in committee.
Despite its apparent declining support, on May 22, 2003, Representative Markey
again returned to this issue when he introduced the National Amusement Park Ride
Safety Act of 2003.211 This bill was essentially a duplicate of the 1999 and 2001 bills
again primarily seeking to repeal the 1981 amendment. Apparently hoping to avoid the
same fate as his previous two bills, Representative Markey publicized that a variety of
consumer groups, as well as the American Academy of Pediatrics, as supporting this
bill.212 This bill also attempted to seize upon the fact that, several weeks before its
introduction, an 11 year old child died while riding a rollercoaster at the Six Flags Great
America park in Gurnee, Illinois.213
As of the date of this article, the 2003 bill remains in committee. No hearings
have occurred on this bill and fewer than 20 co-sponsors have signed on. Nevertheless,
because this issue is just one or two deadly accidents away from being thrust back into
the public spotlight, one very important question must still be addressed: should the
safety of fixed-site amusement parks be federally or state regulated? A careful review of
all the facts concerning this issue demonstrates that the current federal effort to assign
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jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions to the CPSC is founded upon faulty facts and a
flawed rationale—and may even go so far as to decreasing, rather than increasing,
consumer safety.
III.

A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Park Safety Regulation
Should Remain a State-Governed Issue.

The current efforts, led by Representative Markey, to re-assign safety regulatory
authority over fixed-site park attractions to the CPSC are based on four general
arguments.214 Significantly, a careful review of each argument reveals that all four are
flawed to the point of fundamentally undermining objective support for this proposed
action. These flaws are best demonstrated by the faulty facts and logic upon the
proponents of NAPRSA base their arguments.
The end result is that enacting NAPRSA would create such procedural and
substantive confusion and inefficiency that it enacting could very well increase the safety
risk to guests at fixed-site attractions rather than decrease it. As a result, the following
analysis seeks to debunk the primary arguments in favor of NAPRSA and demonstrate
why fixed-site amusement park safety regulation should remain a state-governed issue.
In addition, appended to this section is a spreadsheet that contains a detailed
analysis of all existing state fixed-site attraction safety regulations. Finally, based upon
this extensive analysis, this section offers a proposed model state law for the safety
governance of fixed-site amusement attractions.
Error #1:
“The number of serious injuries on ‘fixed location’ rides has risen dramatically from
1994 through 1998.”215
During each of the three Congressional sessions that the NAPRSA has been
introduced, its supporters have relied upon the argument that fixed-site attraction
accidents have been on the increase: “[t]he accident statistics highlight the folly of
granting an exemption from federal safety regulation to amusement park rides. Injuries
are rising rapidly on the one category of amusement park rides that the CPSC is barred
from overseeing.”216
Specific claims by the bill’s supporters have included: “[e]mergency room
injuries more than doubled in the last five years”217 and “[b]eginning in 1996, a sharp
upward trend can be seen in hospital emergency room visits by passengers on
‘fixed’rides...These injuries soared 96 percent over the next five years.”218
As a basis for these claims, the bill’s proponents have relied upon consumer
injury statistics derived from the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System
(“NEISS”). However, a careful review of the NEISS reveals that its statistics regarding
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consumer injuries on fixed-site attractions is simply unreliable—primarily because of the
flawed methodology used to develop these statistics. In fact, not only have independent
studies recognized these flaws, but the CPSC itself has now acknowledged that the
NEISS fixed-site attraction injury statistics are unreliable. To understand why these
statistics are unreliable, one must first understand the NEISS itself.
A.

The History and Development of the National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System.

The CPSC uses the NEISS to provide it with consumer injury statistics involving
fixed-site attractions. It is a “probability sample of hospital emergency departments in
the United States and its territories.”219 The NEISS is designed to “produce national
estimates of the number of consumer products-related injuries treated in hospital
emergency rooms.”220 Essentially, the NEISS is analogous to a national political poll on
an issue or candidate. Like those polls, the NEISS results are not generated from a
complete census of all hospitals (or voters) but are obtained using a mathematical
equation to create a reliable representative sample of hospitals (or voters).
The NEISS was created in 1971221 using a sample of 119 hospitals in an attempt
to quantify the number of consumer product injuries.222 In October 1978, the NEISS was
redesigned using a new sample based upon an updated inventory of U.S. hospitals.223
The 1978 redesign also changed the way the NEISS was organized by dividing the
sample hospitals into four strata based on size.224 This stratified approach allows for a
more precise manipulation of the NEISS data than the initial non-stratified approach
because it further sub-categorizes the data itself.
In 1989 and 1991, the NEISS sample was again updated to use a more updated
hospital inventory in the former case and to increase the overall sample size in the latter
case.225 The NEISS sample was again redesigned in 1997 to incorporate the latest
available U.S. hospital inventory as well as make minor structural changes.226 Finally, in
1999, the CPSC began to adjust the NEISS sample annually to insure that it used the
most updated hospital inventory (and, thus, obtained the most reliable data).227
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Another major change occurred in 2000 when the CPSC decided to expand the
NEISS to collect data on all hospital treated injuries rather than just those resulting from
consumer product use.228 This expansion allowed the CPSC to generate data from a
variety of other circumstances, including injuries in which there is no specific product
mentioned and injuries for products that fall outside the jurisdiction of the CPSC.229
Information is collected for analysis under the NEISS by four methods:
1.
continual and routine surveillance of emergency department
injuries from NEISS sample hospitals;
2.
non-routine special surveillance projects (this method is usually
reserved for CPSC research into specific types of injuries or products);
3.
CPSC telephone interviews of specific injury victims or witnesses
(this method constitutes less than 1% of all cases and is usually also
reserved for specific research projects);
4.
CPSC on-site investigations (this method is utilized even less often
than the telephone interviews).230
The procedure for obtaining data generated by the continual and routine
surveillance method involves a system in which the type of injury and other basic patient
information is entered onto the patient’s medical record each time a patient presents
herself to a NEISS sample hospital’s emergency department.231 Each evening, a hospitaldesignated NEISS coordinator enters the relevant information using a special NEISS
coding manual and then transmits that data via electronic means to the CPSC’s internal
database where it is then manipulated to generate consumer injury statistics.232
Overall, the NEISS appears to be a highly-credible source for statistical consumer
injury information. And, in fact, proponents of NAPRSA have supported their claims
that fixed-site amusement ride injuries have dramatically increased by using NEISSgenerated data. Simply put, the presumed credibility of the NEISS injury data serves as a
core foundation for NAPRSA’s attempt to federalize fixed-site amusement park safety
regulations. It stands to reason then that, if the NEISS data relied upon by proponents of
NAPRSA to evidence an alleged increase in fixed-site amusement ride injuries was
flawed, then that argument itself would be flawed and unreliable.
B.

Independent Studies Have Concluded that the NEISS Statistics
for Consumer Fixed-site Attraction Injuries are Unreliable.

While the NAPRSA proponents point to an alleged “dramatic” increase in fixedsite attraction injuries as grounds for federalizing fixed-site attraction regulation, several
recent independent studies have demonstrated that, not only have such injuries not
increased, but, in some instances, they have actually decreased. One report, for example,
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involved a detailed analysis of various engineering and scientific literature (including
CPSC materials).233 This report plainly concluded that a variety of deficiencies
precluded any credible reliance on the NEISS injury data as developed by the CPSC:
The use of a single product code that includes amusement attractions of all
types, the mis-match between the geographic distribution of amusement
parks and NEISS hospitals, changes in the sample of hospitals beginning
in 1997, and the redaction of ride and park specific identifiers reduces the
usefulness of NEISS data for estimating amusement park ride injuries and
assessing trends.234
These deficiencies clearly demonstrate the inherent unreliability of the claims by
the supporters of NAPRSA that consumer fixed-site attraction injuries are increasing—
since those claims are based on the CPSC’s flawed methodology of using the NEISS
data.
The report, however, did not just demonstrate the unreliability of the CPSC’s use
of the NEISS data. Instead, the report took the important additional step of re-analyzing
the raw NEISS data in light of the identified deficiencies in the CPSC’s methodology for
analyzing the same data. After developing a revised and more accurate methodology for
analyzing the raw NEISS statistics, this report concluded (among other things) that:
1.
“[A]nalysis of CPSC NEISS data from 1997-2001 showed no
statistical increase in the national estimate of the number of injuries
associated with fixed site amusement park attractions over that time period
while attendance has increased.”235
2.
“[A]nalysis of CPSC NEISS data from 1997 to 2001 indicate[s]
that risk of injury associated with fixed site amusement parks has not
exhibited a statistically significant trend during that time. Risk of injury
associated with fixed site amusement park attractions has dropped in each
of the last two years.”236
The clear result is that, while NAPRSA proponents assert that consumer fixed-site
attraction injuries have increased—thus, warranting federal intervention—an independent
analysis of the raw injury statistics directly refutes that claim.
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Another report, thisone prepared by the American Association of Neurological
Surgeons, further demonstrated the inherent flaws of the CPSC NEISS data relied upon
by the supporters of NAPRSA.237 Like the first study, this study also found various
deficiencies with the CPSC’s NEISS data, including injury coding that was too
generalized, hospital reporting abnormalities, and ineffective sampling methods such as
small sample numbers that could “significantly skew results.”238 These deficiencies led
the report to conclude that “[w]hile the CPSC data is probably useful for well distributed,
and clearly identified product categories (e.g. toasters), it is not designed for determining
incidence rates for these exceedingly rare and difficult to identify events.”239
Other independent reports have further characterized the unreliability of the
CPSC’s NEISS data as everything from being plagued with a “high degree of
imprecision”240 to being nothing more than a “wild ass guess”.241 In sum, the
independent reports and studies that have considered the CPSC NEISS incident statistics
have roundly criticized those figures as unreliable and certainly not a sound basis for
arguing that consumer fixed-site attraction injuries are on the increase. However, those
outside the CPSC have not only leveled this criticism. In fact, recently, even the CPSC
has acknowledged the unreliability of its very own NEISS statistics.
C.

The CPSC Itself Has Concluded that the NEISS Statistics for
Consumer Fixed-Site Attraction Injuries are Unreliable.

The CPSC itself has now concluded that its own reliance upon the NEISS
statistics it generated was flawed since its current methodology is simply unreliable. In
particular, the CPSC recently published a report titled, Amusement Ride-Related Injuries
and Deaths in the United States: 2003 Update,242 that stated:
Because fixed-site injuries occur in a relatively small number of locations,
the sites of amusement and theme parks, the number of recorded injuries
in NEISS depends to a large degree on the geographical closeness of the
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NEISS hospitals to the parks. Thus, the utility of NEISS for estimating
fixed-site ride injuries may be limited.243
The CPSC found the utility of the NEISS to estimate fixed-site attraction injuries
to be so limited that it did not even include such injuries in the body of the report.244 In
fact, not only did the CPSC find the original NEISS statistics to be unreliable, but, upon
re-analyzing these statistics, the CPSC even found at least one recent instance where
yearly fixed-site attraction injuries had actually decreased:
Since the last report, the NEISS injury records for amusement rides have
been extensively reviewed. Based on this review, historical estimates that
appear in this report differ from those of previous reports. The largest
difference is for the year 2001, in which the fixed-site estimate is lower
and the mobile estimate is higher than in the previous report.245
So what does this report mean? Basically, it means that the CPSC itself does not
believe that the NEISS accident statistics relied upon by the NAPRSA proponents are
reliable. Considered alongside the fact that independent studies have also found these
accident statistics to be unreliable, the clear import of these findings is that the claim that
“the number of serious injuries on ‘fixed location’ rides has risen dramatically from 1994
through 1998” lacks any objective support and certainly does not serve as a legitimate
basis for removing the responsibility of fixed-site attraction safety regulation from the
states and assigning jurisdiction to the CPSC.
Error #2:
“[M]any states have simply failed to step in where the federal safety agency has been
excluded.”246
As an additional basis for federalizing all fixed-site attraction safety regulation,
the proponents of NAPRSA have repeatedly pointed to the fact that several states
maintain no fixed-site attraction safety law while several others maintain only cursory
laws that lack any real regulatory power. While it is true that two states have not passed
a fixed-site attraction safety law, and that several other states passed law with only
minimal enforcement provisions, the argument that these states are “many” in nature is
simply inaccurate. This inaccuracy is demonstrated by the comparative study of existing
state fixed-site safety laws that is attached to this article as Appendix A.
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A.

A Review of Existing State Fixed-Site Attraction Safety Laws
Reveals that the Vast Majority of States are Properly
Exercising their Traditional Police Power over Public Safety.

The study whose results are memorialized in Appendix A was conducted by
identifying all existing state laws and/or regulations247 addressing fixed-site attraction
safety and then analyzing the similarities (and dissimilarities) of these laws. A review of
Appendix A clearly reveals that a vast majority of states maintain extensive safety laws
that regulate a variety of issues involving fixed-site amusement parks most notably
including:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The requirement of pre-operation and post-operation inspections
The requirement that operators maintain liability insurance
The requirement that operators report certain types of fixed-site attraction
incidents
The authority of the state to close or suspend operation of an attraction
The authority of the state to fine or otherwise penalize fixed-site attraction
operators
The authority of the state to require certain attraction safety postings for
guests248

While not all of the existing state fixed-site attraction safety laws maintain all of
these types of provisions, the laws of over 40 states currently maintain at least four of
these provisions (as well as additional provisions identified in Appendix A). Quite
clearly, an actual objective review of these existing laws reveals that there is not the
widespread lack of state-based fixed-site attraction regulations as claimed by the
NAPRSA proponents. Simply repeating this myth at every opportunity does not prove it
true. Instead, short of the states beginning a mass repeal of existing fixed-site attraction
safety laws, the reality is just the opposite of the argument propounded by the NAPRSA
proponent—“many states” do have fixed-site attraction safety laws that provide a broad
range of regulatory mechanisms.
B.

State-Based Regulation of Fixed-Site Attractions Offers
Concrete Advantages Over Federal-Based Fixed-Site
Attraction Regulation.

The question of does the federal government have legal authority to regulate
fixed-site attraction (whether it be through the Commerce Clause, some type of police
powers of its own that it might have accrued as a sovereign governmental entity or by
other means) certainly serves as an interesting legal theory debate. However, it avoids
the practical question of should the federal government seek to regulate fixed-site
attractions. Even if the federal government maintained such a right in theory, it simply
247
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could not prudently displace the states prudently as the primary regulator of fixed-site
attractions. In fact, the CPSC itself has previously recognized that, even though might
have the legal authority to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in some instances, the safety
issue might still be best addressed by the state governments: “[e]ven though the
Consumer Product Safety Commission has authority to regulate the safety of paddle
boats, the problem in this case could probably be best solved by the state or local
authorities.”249
In the case of fixed-site amusement attractions, there are concrete advantages to
maintaining state safety regulation of this area. For example, the CPSC has not inspected
or otherwise regulated a single fixed-site attraction since 1980. Importantly, during these
last twenty plus years, the engineering, operating, and maintaining of fixed-site
amusement attractions has changed, with today’s attractions not only going faster, higher,
and farther, but—with the development of computers and other technology—becoming
much more complex than any fixed-site attraction that the CPSC briefly regulated from
roughly 1976 to 1980.
Conversely, the states have much more experience at inspecting and regulating
fixed-site attractions. Some states have regulated these attractions even prior to 1976,
while still others have developed their programs during the interim. This has resulted in
the states employing or contracting with personnel, such as attraction inspectors, who
over this time have developed expertise concerning the increased complexities of fixedsite amusement attractions. If fixed-site attraction regulation was suddenly re-assigned to
the federal government, the federal government would have to either train new inspectors
from scratch or hire away currently trained inspectors from the states (since the states
would no longer need such inspectors).
In doing so, the federal government would have to choose between relocating all
of its inspectors to a central location or open up a series of regional and/or local
inspection offices across the country. After all, unlike nearly all of the consumer
products that the CPSC regulates, fixed-site amusement attractions cannot be shipped to a
central CPSC office for testing. Either approach will result in a great expense to the
CPSC to simply set up the inspection system, much less actually conduct inspections at
the approximately 600 fixed-site parks across the country. The reality is that, even before
the CPSC actually inspects a single fixed-site attraction, it will have invested
thousands—if not millions—of dollars re-creating a system that currently exists in nearly
all states.
Moreover, federalizing the entire fixed-site amusement regulation system would
also eliminate the inherent advantages of maintaining an inspection operation near the
actual fixed-site attractions since those attractions cannot practically be shipped to a
centralized CPSC testing facility. Again, while the proximity of the inspectors might not
matter if the product was one that could be promptly and, if needed, regularly shipped to
a central CPSC testing facility (such as a blender or lawn mower), because of its very
nature, this cannot be done with a fixed-site attraction. Thus, if an incident did occur on a
fixed-site attraction, in order to most quickly respond to that incident, the CPSC would
have to maintain a large set of regional and/or local offices—a very costly proposition
that the CPSC has previously dismantled.
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This problem goes directly to the question of whether Congress should federalize
fixed-site amusement attraction regulation (even if it legally could do so) and was
directly addressed during the contentious debates that followed the 1981 Amendment. In
particular, during a 1985 hearing on the issue, one of the CPSC commissioners succinctly
outlined the practical problem with federalizing fixed-site attraction regulation:
The record before us does not indicate a crying need that should override
our current system of federalism with the practical effect of reinventing
the wheel at the Federal level. The State and local governments, in
cooperation with industry, have logged impressive safety records. In light
of their fine work, I do not feel it is necessary to embark on a duplicative,
costly Federal program. We ought to instead encourage adoption of an
inspection program in those States that do not have them, but where there
is a need.250
Ultimately, this CPSC commissioner concluded that the determination of who
should regulate fixed-site attractions ought not to turn on who legally could but rather
what level of government was best situated do so: “[i]f we are really concerned with
maximizing consumer safety...we should first ask if this job is really the legitimate
function of the Federal Government or if the State and local governments are not the
more appropriate holders of this regulatory responsibility.”251
A careful review of the existing state fixed-site safety laws demonstrates that,
while a few exceptions do exist, state governments clearly maintain an expertise and
scope of knowledge and experience that vastly outweighs the brief fixed-site safety
regulatory foray by the CPSC from the late 1970s. This alone is a compelling reason
why, even if the federal government could legally exert regulatory authority in this area,
the state governments are certainly “the more appropriate holders of this regulatory
responsibility.”252
C.

Even if Several States Have Not Promulgated Fixed-Site
Attraction Safety Regulations, that Does Not Serve as a Sound
Basis for Removing Regulatory Authority from those States
that Have Promulgated Safety Regulations.
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One of the main reasons that NAPRSA proponents offer for eliminating all state
based fixed-site attraction regulation is because a very small number of states have not
passed any fixed-site amusement law or have passed only cursory regulations that barely
serve to provide regulatory safeguards. This is hardly a sound basis for federalizing this
entire field because, as demonstrated above, it would eliminate a vast regulatory network
currently in place for fixed-site attraction guests.
However, the question can be reasonably asked, what about guests in those small
minority of states with no or little safety regulation of fixed-site attractions? Two
reasonable options seem to exist: 1) permit the CPSC to regulate those states without
fixed-site attraction safety laws (similar to the approach taken in the mid-1980s by
Senator Simon’s bill) or 2) persuade those states with no, or very little, safety regulation
of fixed-site attractions to promptly pass a comprehensive fixed-site amusement
attraction safety law.
When fully considered, the second option is rife with potential because it would
allow the individual states to continue to experiment with the most effective methods for
safeguarding guest safety on fixed-site attractions, while at the same time saving the
CPSC from having to establish a nationwide inspection and enforcement network. In
light of these practical benefits that could be realized by convincing states to adopt
comprehensive regulations, this project undertook an effort to carefully analyze the
various state-based approaches toward regulating fixed-site attractions. This effort
resulted in the comparative study of all state fixed-site attraction safety laws that
accompanies this article as Appendix A.
Persuading those states with little or no safety regulation that some legislation is
required is only half the battle though. Instead, one should provide these states with
guidance in drafting and enacting such a law. Therefore, in addition to the comparative
study, this project has also prepared the model state fixed-site attraction safety law that is
attached hereto as Appendix B. This model law was drafted to include those provisions
from existing fixed-site attraction safety laws that were deemed to best safeguard guests.
The goal of this model law is to provide all states with a framework of significant
provisions from existing state laws while specifically providing those states with little or
no regulation an efficient means to begin formulating a comprehensive state-based fixedsite park safety regulation.
Error #3:
“[S]tates are not equipped and not inclined to act as a national clearinghouse of safety
problems associated with particular rides or with operator or patron errors.”253
As a further basis for their effort, NAPRSA proponents have essentially argued
that the states are not equipped to regulate fixed-site amusement attractions and,
therefore, Congress should re-assign the responsibility of fixed-site attraction regulation
to the CPSC. However, in addition to the fact (as discussed above) that the CPSC
currently does not possess any expertise or experience in this field, this argument fails for
a very threshold reason: the CPSC does not have sufficient funding to regulate fixed-site
attractions. In fact, the disparity between the amount that NAPRSA would appropriate to
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the CPSC for this responsibility and the amount that the CPSC itself is on record as
stating it will need to actually execute this new responsibility is huge.
NAPRSA seeks to appropriate $500,000 to the CPSC to regulate fixed-site
attractions: “[t]here are authorized to be appropriated to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission $500,000 for each fiscal year to enable the Commission to carry out the
Consumer Product Safety Act as amended by this Act.”254
As early as 1999, however, the CPSC advised Congress that, in addition to extra
staff (and the attendant costs incurred with adding staff), the CPSC would also require
millions of dollars to regulate fixed-site attractions: “The Commission would require at
least $5 million dollars and additional staff to address the safety of these products.”255
Now, five years later, NAPRSA still seeks to apportion millions of dollars less the
amount that CPSC has stated it would need to actually regulate fixed-site attractions.
This disparity represents a very real threat to consumer safety at fixed-site
attractions and raises alarming questions regarding whether the federal government really
would be sufficiently equipped to conduct a comprehensive and nationwide fixed-site
attraction regulatory effort. This question must be confronted at the same time that, not
only has not a single state repealed its fixed-site attraction safety law but, in fact, several
states (including California, the state with the most fixed-site parks) have bolstered their
own fixed-site safety regulations. Clearly, the claim by NAPRSA proponents that the
states are unequipped to regulate fixed-site attractions ignores the current standing of
existing state regulations as well as the financial realities that the CPSC would face were
it to engage in a nationwide fixed-site regulatory program—a reality that even the CPSC
itself recognizes would be substantially under funded by the proposed appropriations
under NAPRSA.
The real and tangible danger confronted by fixed-site attraction guests under a
federalized approach to fixed-site attraction regulation was succinctly described, by a
CPSC commissioner no less, nearly twenty years ago during Congressional hearings on
this issue: “[t]o provide jurisdiction over 660 fixed-site parks without the ability to
properly inspect them, as obviously we could not, would be nothing short of a regulatory
mirage. Sometimes in a well-intended quest for consumer guardianship we turn too
easily to the Federal quick fix...”256
Nearly two decades later, NAPRSA still remains nothing more than shiny, high
publicity mirage whose primary effect will be to disguise a grossly under funded and illequipped regulatory scheme dressed up with a glossy public relations outfit—a truly
modern example of an emperor without clothes.
Error #4:
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“The manufacturer or owner of every other consumer product in America is required by
law to inform the CPSC whenever it becomes aware that the product may pose a
substantial risk of harm.”257
NAPRSA proponents have repeatedly claimed that “[e]very other consumer
product affecting interstate commerce…endures CPSC oversight.”258 This argument
seems to suggest that, since everything else is CPSC-regulated, then fixed-site attractions
should be CPSC-regulated as well. The danger with this argument is that it emphasizes
form over substance because it fails to reveal any specific reason why the CPSC would
be a better regulator of this field.
Worse yet, the statement itself is inaccurate. First, it assumes that fixed-site
attraction attractions are “consumer products” despite the fact that, as discussed earlier in
this article, two different circuits have disagreed on that issue and the Supreme Court has
not resolved this disagreement between the circuits. However, that is not the limit of this
argument’s inaccuracy though.
Instead, as also discussed earlier in this article, contrary Congressman Markey’s
misstatement, a variety of other products used by consumers are not regulated by the
CPSC. The CPSC does not, for example, regulate consumer boat safety, consumer drugs,
food, cosmetics, or medical devices, consumer motor vehicles or tires or consumer
aircraft safety. Rather, all of these areas are regulated by federal entities other than the
CPSC. Moreover, the safety of some products used by consumers—such as consumer
office buildings, meeting places or homes—are not regulated by the federal government
at all, but, instead, are regulated by state and local authorities.
The simple fact is that, even if NAPRSA supporters could reveal a compelling
reason why consumers would actually benefit from amassing the safety regulation of all
products under a single roof, the reality is that they have not. Quite simply, NAPRSA
supporters erroneous statements notwithstanding, all products used by consumers are not
regulated by the CPSC. Therefore, it is highly dubious for NAPRSA proponents to rely
on such a claim as a basis for dismantling the existing state-based regulatory structure
and replacing it with an under funded, inexperienced, and ill-equipped federal regulatory
device.
IV.

Conclusion

Fixed-site amusement parks are a unique type of product because all interaction
with these products—whether it be their use, inspection, or otherwise—must come to the
attraction rather than bringing the attraction to the one seeking interaction. For practical
reasons, this has resulted in states regulating the safety of fixed-site amusement
attractions within their own borders. The states have been empowered to engage in this
regulation through their traditional police powers over their citizenry’s safety.
As the trend toward federalizing other types of products used by consumers has
expanded, so has the pressure to fold fixed-site attraction safety regulation into the
federal tent. In fact, for a brief time, the federal government—through the CPSC—
engaged in such regulation. However, in 1981, Congress clarified the question that had
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divided the circuit courts: did fixed-site attractions fall within the scope of the CPSC’s
regulatory authority? In answering no to this question, Congress opted to leave states in
charge of regulating fixed-site attractions.
Since that time, nearly all of the states have passed laws doing just that, although,
admittedly, a few states remain that have either no fixed-site attraction regulation or just
the barest of legislation. Because effective fixed-site attraction regulation is a compelling
need for the public, several members of Congress—aided by various advocacy groups—
have renewed the effort to federalize fixed-site attraction regulation within the CPSC. In
doing so, these proponents have offered a variety of reasons, including the erroneous
assertion that fixed-site amusement ride safety has dramatically decreased during recent
years as well as the inaccurate assumption that the CPSC is better-situated to conduct
such a regulatory effort.
All of these arguments are fatally flawed in that they are either premised on
inaccurate information or unsound logic. In fact, a careful review and analysis of existing
state fixed-site attraction safety laws reveals just the opposite of what these arguments
suggest. States are engaging in an increasingly thorough and, based upon independent
empirical studies, more effective governance of fixed-site attraction safety. The prospect
of removing this authority from the states and reassigning it to a federal agency--that
admittedly has neither the funding nor the manpower to undertake such an effort-demands an immediate and objective evaluation of whether this should occur. The mere
fact that the federal government may or may not have a legitimate basis for exercising
such authority does not automatically mean that it should exercise such authority.
In the case of fixed-site amusement parks, there is absolutely no objective
evidence that the federal government can more competently or effectively regulate this
important and growing field. The only exception to this might be for the federal
government to intervene and regulate fixed-site attractions in those states that have failed
to pass a fixed-site safety law (or have failed to pass a law that is more than the barest of
bones in nature). Other than these two isolated situations, once the rhetoric and
demagoguery are stripped away, the result is that the objective facts and data simply do
not demonstrate a need to federalize fixed-site attractions.
For these reasons, this article has endeavored to provide a detailed and objective
examination into the development of this area of law as well as the existing state of fixedsite amusement attraction regulation. Upon doing so, the conclusion is very clear: the
states are better-equipped and better-situated to regulate consumer use of fixed-site
amusement park attractions, and should maintain their jurisdiction over the issue.
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APPENDIX A
Authority to Specific
Assess
Provision for
Penalties? Appealing
Penalties?

NO

Authority to
Charge
Permit or
Inspection
Fees?
YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------
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YES [1]

YES

YES

YES

YES
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Statutory Citation
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Daily
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Alabama

ALA. CODE §§ 11-51-102 (2003); 40-12-47
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NO

--------

Alaska

ALASKA STAT. §§ 05.20.010-05.20.120
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(2003); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 78.01078.180 (2003)
NO STATUTE
--------

YES

Delaware

ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-501 to 23-89-518
(2003)
CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 7900-7932 (LEXIS
2003)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-20-101 (2003); 8 COLO.
CODE REGS. 1101-12 (2002)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-129 to 29-143(a)
(2003)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 6401-6409 (2003)
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NO

YES
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YES

YES [2]

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

Georgia

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES
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YES
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IOWA CODE §§ 88A.1-88A.17 (2003)
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YES

YES[3]

Annually

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut

Indiana

Iowa
Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4801 to 40-4804
(2002)
Kentucky
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 247.232 to 247.236
(LEXIS 2002)
Louisiana
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1484.1 to 40:1484.13
(2003)
Maine
8 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-502, 801-806
(2003)
Maryland
MD. BUS. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to 3-601
(2003); CODE MD. REGS. tit. 9.12§62.0062.20 (2004)
Massachusetts MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 205A (LEXIS
2003); 520 Code Mass. Regs. 1.00-13.14
(2004)
Michigan
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 408.651-408.670
(2003)
Minnesota
MINN. STAT. §§ 184B.01-184B.07 (2002)
Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. §21-19-33 (2003)

[1]Arkansas law only requires government certification or employment of inspectors for inspections during operation. [2]Florida law exempts "permanent facilities that employ at least 1,000 full-time
employees and that maintain full-time, in-house safety inspectors ' from its codified safety regulations. [3] Minnesota law exempts fixed-site amusement facilities that have in-house inspectors, a daily ride
inspection program and a liability insurance policy not less than $50,000,000.00 from its safety inspection regulation set forth in Minn. state. ss 184B.03.
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NO

Required
Posting of
Safety
Instruction
Signs?
NO

Ride
Provision for
Operator Age Requesting
Restrictions? Variance
from Safety
Regulations?
NO
NO

Provision
Allowing
Concurrent
Municipal
Regulations?
YES

Provision
Establishing
Dedicated
Attraction
Fund?
NO

NO

YES

YES (18)

YES

YES

NO

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

24 hrs

YES

YES

YES

YES (16)

NO

NO

YES

Immediately

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

Every two
years
4 hrs

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Next Bus Day YES

NO

NO

YES (16)

NO

NO

NO

NO

Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

--------

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

Varies

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

Indiana

NO

--------

YES

4 hrs

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Iowa

YES

Varies

NO

Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

--------

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

Kansas

YES

1 million

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

Kentucky

YES

Varies

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

Louisiana

YES

1 million

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

Maine

YES

[4]

--------

--------

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

Maryland

YES

No set
amount
Varies

YES

24 hrs

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

Massachusetts YES

1 million

YES

48 hrs

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Michigan

YES

300k

[4]

Death/Serious
Inj.
Medical
Treatment
--------

--------

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

Minnesota

YES

1 million

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Mississippi

NO

--------

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

If YES,
Required
Within What Retention of
Time Frame? Inspection or
Maintenance
Records?
-------NO

Provision
Describing
Duties of
Guests?

Death/Serious
Inj.

48 hrs

NO

--------

--------

--------

1 million

YES

YES

1 million

YES

Colorado

YES

Varies

YES

Death/Serious
Inj.
Death/Serious
Inj.
"any accident"

Connecticut

YES

1 million

YES

Delaware

YES

1 million

NO

Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

DC

NO

--------

NO

--------

Florida

YES

1 million

YES

Hospitalization 4 hrs

Georgia

YES

YES

Hawaii

NO

No set
amount
--------

Idaho

NO

Illinois

Jurisdiction

Required If YES,
Liability
What
Insurance Amount?
or Bond?

If YES, What
Required
Type of
Incident
Reporting? Injuries?

Alabama

NO

--------

NO

--------

Alaska

YES

1 million

YES

Arizona

--------

--------

Arkansas

YES

California

[4]Maine, Michigan, Montana, and Nevada laws require guests,
rather than operators, to report incidents involving injuries to
themselves.
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Authority to
Order
Attraction
Repairs?

Authority to
Close
Attraction?

Authority to
Charge
Permit or
Inspection
Fees?

Authority to
Assess
Penalties?

Specific
Provision for
Appealing
Penalties?

NO

Required
Government
Certification
or
Employment
of
Inspectors?
NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

Annually

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

Annually

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Annually

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Annually

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

Jurisdiction

Statutory Citation

Required
PreOperation
Inspections
?

Required
Inspections
During
Operation?

If YES, How
Often?

Required
Daily
Inspection
by Operator?

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT. §§ 316.200-316.237 (2003)

YES

YES

Annually

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-741 to 27-1-745
(2003)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1801 to 48-1820
(2003)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 455B.010-455B.100
(2003)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321-A:1 to 321-A:9
(2002)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:3-31 to 5:3-59 (2003);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE 5:14A-1.1 to 5:14A-9 (2004)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-25-1 to 57-25-6 (2003)

NO

NO

YES

Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 870-a to 870-m (Consol.
2003)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-111.1 to 95-111.18
(2003)
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-05.1-01 to 53-05.1-05
(2003)
Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1711.50-1711.99
(Anderson 2003)
Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, §§ 460.1-469 (2003)

YES

YES

Annually

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 460.310-460.370
(2001)
Pennsylvania 4 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. §§ 401-419, 501507 (2003)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-34.1-1 to 23-34.1-18
(2002)
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-18-10 to 41-18-150
(2002); S.C. CODE REGS. 71-4000 to 71-4950
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 42-10-1 to 42-10-3
(2003)
Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-38-101 to 56-38-105
(2003)
Texas
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.001-2151.153
(2003); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, §§ 5.90015.9014 (2003)
Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-61 (2003)

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

Monthly

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

Annually

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

Annually

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

[5]

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 721-724 (2003)

NO

NO

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98.3 (2003); 13 VA.
ADMIN. CODE 5-31-10 to 5-31-180 (2003)
W ASH. REV. CODE §§ 67.42.010-67.42.901
(2003)
W. VA. CODE §§ 21-10-1 to 21-10-19 (2003)

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

Annually

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Annually

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. § 101.12 (2002); W IS. ADMIN. CODE, YES
YES
Annually
Com. §§ 34.001-34.43 (2003)
Wyoming
NO STATUTE FOR FIXED-SITE
---------------------ATTRACTIONS
[5]Texas law exempts fixed-site amusement facilities with attendance greater than
200,000 guests in the preceding year from the state's authority to prohibit operation of
an amusement attraction.
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YES

Required
Posting of
Safety
Instruction
Signs?
NO

Ride
Provision for
Operator Age Requesting
Restrictions? Variance
from Safety
Regulations?
NO
NO

Provision
Allowing
Concurrent
Municipal
Regulations?
YES

Provision
Establishing
Dedicated
Attraction
Fund?
NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Provision
Describing
Duties of
Guests?

--------

If YES, What If YES,
Required
Required
Type Injuries? Within What Retention of
Incident
Time Frame? Inspection or
Reporting?
Maintenance
Records?
YES
Death/Serious Immediately YES
Inj.
[4]
--------------NO

YES

[6]

YES

Nevada

NO

--------

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

YES

Jurisdiction

Required
If YES,
Liability
What
Insurance or Amount?
Bond?

Missouri

YES

1 million

Montana

NO

Nebraska

No Specific
Time
--------

YES

NO

NO

YES (16)

NO

YES

YES

[4]

Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

Varies

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

1 million

YES

Immediately

YES

YES

YES

YES (16)

YES

YES

NO

New Mexico

YES

3 million

NO

Non-minor
injuries
--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

New York

YES

Varies

YES

Next Bus Day NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

North
YES
Carolina
North Dakota YES

Varies

YES

24 hours

NO

NO

NO

YES (18)

YES

NO

NO

Varies

YES

Death/Serious
Inj.
Death/Serious
Inj.
Accident

YES

NO

NO

YES (16)

NO

NO

NO

Ohio

YES

Varies

YES

Accident

No Specific
Time
24 hours

YES

YES

YES

YES (16)

YES

NO

YES

Oklahoma

YES

1 million

NO

--------

--------

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

Oregon

YES

Varies

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Pennsylvania YES

Varies

YES

48 hours

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

Rhode Island YES

1 million

YES

24 hours

YES

NO

NO

YES (18)

NO

NO

NO

South
YES
Carolina
South Dakota YES

Varies

YES

Next Bus Day YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

1million

NO

Death/Serious
Inj.
Death/Serious
Inj.
Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

Tennessee

YES

250k

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

Texas

YES

Varies

YES

Quarterly

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Utah

NO

--------

NO

Non-minor
Injuries
--------

--------

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

Vermont

YES

1 million

NO

--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

YES (18)

NO

NO

NO

Virginia

YES

200k

YES

24 hours

NO

NO

NO

YES (16)

YES

NO

NO

Washington

YES

Death/Serious
Inj.
--------

--------

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

Death/Serious
Inj.
"more than
first-aid"
--------

24 hours

NO

YES

NO

YES (16)

NO

NO

YES

24 hours

YES

NO

NO

YES (18)

YES

NO

NO

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

--------

1 million

NO

West Virginia YES

Varies

YES

Wisconsin

NO

--------

YES

Wyoming

--------

--------

--------

[6]Nebraska law provides that the "minimum amount' of liability
insurance shall not be greater than one million dollars per
occurrence." Neb. Rev. Stat. Ss48-1806
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APPENDIX B
A Model State Statute for Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Regulation.
SECTION 1. Introduction and Purpose.
The purpose of this [Act] shall be to establish uniform standards for the design,
construction, maintenance, operation, and inspection of fixed-site amusement attractions.
SECTION 2. Short Title.
This [Act] shall be cited as the Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Act.
Comment
The statistics set forth in the Comment sections to this proposed model act have been obtained
from an analysis of all existing state fixed-site amusement attraction safety laws. A compilation of the
results of this research and analysis is set forth in Appendix A to the article entitled: The Growing
Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis of Why States
Should Regulate Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety by Chad D. Emerson, Assistant Professor of
Law at Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law.
Please note that, in some cases, a state may engage in a fixed-site amusement attraction
regulatory practices that are not specifically provided for by that state’s fixed-site amusement attraction
safety law or regulations. The compilation has attempted to include those instances within the research
and analysis results when possible. Nevertheless, there may still be some states that engage in certain
regulatory practices outside the specific and express scope of that state’s regulatory law or regulations.
Therefore, in addition to relying upon the compiled research and analysis, the author of this compilation
recommends directly contacting the state entity charged with regulating fixed-site amusement attractions
if more specific questions arise. A directory of state amusement attraction safety regulators can be
found at: http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/amuse.PDF.
48 states and the District of Columbia currently have laws that regulate certain safety aspects of
fixed-site amusement attractions. The two states without any such law are Arizona and Wyoming. At
least eight other states and the District of Columbia have laws that regulate certain aspects of fixed-site
amusement attraction operation, but do not require safety inspections of fixed-site amusement
attractions.
SECTION 3. Definitions.
The foregoing terms in this [Act] are defined as follows:
(A)
“Amusement Attraction” means any building or structure around, over or
through which persons may move or walk, without the aid of any moving device
integral to the building or structure, which provides amusement, pleasure, thrills
or excitement or any mechanical device which carries or conveys passengers
along, around, through or over a fixed or restricted route or course or within a
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defined area, for the purpose of giving its passengers amusement, pleasure, thrills
or excitement.
(B)
“Attendant” means an employee or agent of an amusement attraction
operator responsible for controlling guest access and use of an amusement
attraction.
(C)
“Operator” means any person or entity that owns, leases, manages, or
otherwise controls or maintains legal title to an amusement attraction.
(D)
“Commissioner” means the head of the state governmental department,
division, or agency that has safety regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site
amusement attractions.
(E)
“Department” means the state governmental department, division, or
agency that has safety regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement
attractions.
(F)
“Fixed-Site” means an amusement attraction that is constructed to remain
in a single, affixed location and that is not removed from that single, affixed
location.
(G)
“Guest” means an individual who is preparing to enter, entering,
preparing to use, using, preparing to leave, or leaving an amusement attraction for
amusement purposes.
(H)
“Qualified Inspector” means an individual who is an employee or
independent contractor of a public or private agency and who has satisfied the
qualifications set forth in Section 8 of this [Act].
Comment
Many states choose to regulate this field using language such as amusement rides
or devices. The proposed model act does not use these terms but, instead, uses the term
attraction as that term is more effective because a growing number of amusement
activities do not involve guests riding actual rides. The broader scope of the term
“attraction” allows the proposed model act to encompass not only amusement rides, but
also various non-ride amusement attractions such as interactive shows.
Many states also use language that regulates fixed-site amusement parks rather
than attractions. This approach is less desirable than the approach taken by the proposed
model act of regulating “amusement attractions” because, in various states, amusement
attractions are being operated outside the confines of an “amusement park”. One such
example is the operation of a carousel inside a shopping mall. Regulating specific
attractions, rather than parks, clarifies that all fixed-site attractions fall within the scope
of the Act regardless of their location.

SECTION 4. Duties and Responsibilities of the Department.
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(A)
The Commissioner of the Department shall be responsible for enforcing
all provisions of this [Act]. The Commissioner of the Department may delegate
to a third party or other governmental entity those responsibilities under this [Act]
as the Commissioner deems reasonably necessary so long as the third party or
other governmental entity executes such responsibility in complete accordance
with the provisions of this [Act].
(B)
The Commissioner of the Department shall be responsible for
promulgating all reasonable administrative regulations in furtherance of the
purposes of this [Act] as the Commissioner deems reasonably necessary so long
as such regulations are in compliance with the [State’s Administrative Procedures
Act or equivalent].
Comment
Currently, over 15 states have placed fixed-site amusement attraction regulation
within the Department of Labor (or its equivalent within said state). Five or more states
have placed such regulation within either the Department of Agriculture (or its equivalent
within said state) or the Department of Public Safety (or its equivalent within said state).
The remaining states have placed such regulation within the a variety of other
governmental departments, divisions, or entities such as: Department of Community
Affairs, Department of Consumer Services, Department of Insurance, Department of
Administration, Department of Housing, Department of Licensing and Regulation,
Secretary of State, State Fire Marshall’s Office, Division of Building Safety or a
specially-established governing board.
SECTION 5. Exemptions.
This [Act] shall not apply to the following attractions:
(A)
Non-mechanized playground equipment when admission is not charged
for use of the equipment.
(B)
Coin-operated or other single use-operated attractions designed for two or
fewer guests when admission is not charged for access to the premises on which
such attraction is located.
(C)
Attractions owned and operated by the State or any political subdivision of
the State.
(D)
Activities principally devoted to the exhibition of agricultural, educational,
scientific, religious, or artistic products.
Comment
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Over 40 states have exempted certain fixed-site amusement attractions from the
scope of their regulatory act. The most commonly exempted attractions are playground
equipment, coin-operated attractions, state-operated attractions, and museum-related
attractions. Other types of attractions that have been exempted include: locomotives,
bumper boats, inflatable attractions, simulators, those located at trade shows, those
located at amusement parks with a certain number of employees, and even “articles of
husbandry incidental to any agricultural operation.” See Okla. Stat. tit. § 461 (2003).
SECTION 6. Designated Safety Standards.
(A)
Fixed-site amusement attractions subject to this [Act] shall be designed,
constructed, operated, and maintained pursuant to the following safety standards:
(1) [state-designated mechanical code or standard];
(2) [state-designated electrical code or standard];
(3) [state-designated building code or standard];
(4) [state-designated fire code or standard];
(5) [state-designated plumbing code or standard]; and,
(6) [any other state-designated code or standard deemed necessary by the
Department]
(B)
An operator of an amusement attraction shall not be considered a common
carrier.
Comment
States have adopted a variety of different uniform codes and standards—often
with certain revisions—as the governing safety standards for fixed-site amusement
attractions within their borders. Several states have also promulgated entirely original
standards. The proposed model act highly recommends adopting existing uniform codes
or standards—with limited revisions, if needed—rather than promulgating entirely
original standards, as the existing uniform codes and standards have been subject to
extensive third-party evaluation and review.
Based upon an extensive review of the uniform codes and standards currently
utilized by existing state fixed-site amusement attraction safety laws, the proposed model
act recommends adoption of the following uniform codes and standards: 1) the Uniform
or International Building Code; 2) the National Fire Protection Code; 3) the National
Electric Code; 4) the Uniform Plumbing Code; and 5) the American Society for Testing
and Materials World Standard for the Regulation of Amusement Devices.
SECTION 7. Requirement of Pre-Operational and Operational Inspections.
(A)
Prior to commencing initial operation for guests of a new amusement
attraction subject to this [Act], an amusement attraction operator shall obtain an
initial inspection certificate from a qualified inspector pursuant to the following
procedures:
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(1)
The amusement attraction operator must make a written request for
inspection to the Department at least 60 days prior to commencing
operation of a new amusement attraction for guests.
(2)
The Department shall then notify the amusement attraction
operator in writing of the inspection date.
(3)
The amusement attraction operator shall submit the proper
inspection fee (as set forth in Section 13 of this [Act]) to the Department at
least 5 days prior to a scheduled inspection.
(4)
If the qualified inspector identifies any deficiencies or other
reasonable cause to prohibit the initial operation of a new amusement
attraction for guests, the amusement attraction operator must remedy all
deficiencies or other reasonable causes identified by the qualified
inspector before being issued an initial inspection certificate.
(5)
Before being issued an initial inspection certificate, the amusement
attraction operator must obtain written confirmation from a qualified
safety inspector that the amusement attraction operator has remedied all
such deficiencies or other reasonable causes.
(6)
The initial inspection certificate shall be valid for one year from
the date of issuance.
(B)
After the expiration of the initial inspection certificate, all amusement
attractions subject to this [Act] shall annually obtain a renewal inspection
certificate from a qualified inspector. The amusement attraction operator shall be
responsible for requesting a renewal inspection at least 30 days prior to the
expiration of an initial inspection certificate or a renewal inspection certificate.
(C)
In the event that a qualified inspector cannot conduct a timely renewal
inspection, the existing initial inspection certificate or existing renewal inspection
certificate shall remain valid until such time that a qualified inspector conducts a
renewal inspection.
(D)
All initial and renewal inspection certificates for an amusement attraction
shall be available for public review during regular business hours in a single
location designated by the operator.
Comment
Of the 48 states that currently have laws governing fixed-site amusement
facilities, at least 30 of those states expressly and specifically require that fixed-site
amusement attractions obtain a pre-operation inspection prior to opening to guests.
Of the same 48 states, at least 35 states expressly and specifically require that
fixed-site amusement attractions obtain a re-inspection after the attraction has been
opened to guests. At least 31 of these states require that this re-inspection occur annually
while four of these states require semi-annual re-inspections.
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SECTION 8. Hiring and Qualifications of Inspectors
(A)
No individual may conduct an inspection pursuant to Section 7 of this
[Act] without first obtaining certification as a qualified inspector from the
Department. Any individual seeking certification as a qualified inspector shall
meet at least one of the following qualifications:
(1)
Is certified by the National Association of Amusement Ride Safety
Officials as a Level I, Level II, or Level III amusement ride safety
inspector; or
(2)
Is a licensed mechanical or structural engineer; or
(3)
Has a minimum of five (5) years work experience in the field of
amusement attraction design, construction, or maintenance.
(B)
Qualified inspectors shall pay a yearly registration fee of [$]. All such
fees shall be deposited into the Amusement Attraction Safety Fund created by
Section 20 of this [Act].
Comment
At least 24 states require fixed-site amusement attractions to be either employed
by the regulating governmental entity or obtain certification from the regulating
governmental entity. The proposed model act does not distinguish between whether the
inspector is employed by the regulating governmental entity or by a private entity in the
marketplace.
Instead, the proposed model act adopts an approach that focuses on the
qualifications of the inspector rather than the specific employer of the inspector. The
proposed model act does not believe that amusement attraction safety requires that the
regulating governmental entity directly employ inspectors—especially in light of a
growing trend by state governments toward utilizing contract labor—but, rather, this
issue should solely focus on the objective qualifications and competency of the inspector.
SECTION 9. Powers and Duties of Inspectors and Department
(A)
If a qualified inspector has reasonably concluded that an amusement
attraction presents an imminent hazard to guests, the Commissioner may issue a
temporary cease and desist order that prohibits the operation of the amusement
attraction until such time as the Department has reasonably concluded that the
amusement attraction operator has mitigated the imminently hazardous condition.
(B)
If a qualified inspector has reasonably concluded that an amusement
attraction presents an imminent hazard to guests, the Commissioner may order the
amusement attraction operator to make specific repairs or modifications to
mitigate the imminently hazardous condition.
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(C)
The Department shall mail a copy of any order that it issues under
subsection (A) or (B) to an amusement attraction operator by certified mail, return
receipt requested. The amusement attraction operator shall have the right to
appeal or contest any such order pursuant to the [State’s Administrative
Procedures Act or equivalent]
(D)
The Commissioner may enforce any order issued under this Section by
seeking an injunction or writ of mandamus from a court of competent jurisdiction.
Comment
At least, 36 states have laws that expressly allow inspectors to order repairs to
amusement attractions. At least 34 states also permit either an inspector or the
Commissioner to order that an amusement attraction be closed for a specified period of
time because of a safety hazard.
SECTION 10. Requirement of Liability Insurance
(A)
An amusement attraction operator must maintain one of the following
forms of indemnity at all times during operation of an amusement attraction:
(1)
An insurance policy in an amount not less than [$] per occurrence
for any injury or death to a guest or other individual involving the
amusement attraction; or,
(2)
A bond in an amount not less than [$], except that the aggregate
liability of the surety under that bond shall not exceed the face amount of
the bond; or,
(3)
The amusement attraction operator satisfies all self- insurance
standards promulgated by the [State’s Department of Insurance or
equivalent] demonstrating that the amusement attraction operator
maintains sufficient financial assets to cover any liability for an injury or
death to a guest or other individual involving the use of the amusement
attraction.
(B)
An insurance policy or bond procured to satisfy the requirements of this
Section must be obtained from an insurer or surety licensed by [State’s
Department of Insurance or equivalent] to do business in this state.
Comment
At least 39 states require fixed-site amusement attraction operators to maintain
some type of liability insurance or bond. The amount of insurance required by these 39
states is as follows: 18 states require at least $1,000,000 in liability coverage; two states
require between $250,000 and $1,000,000 in liability coverage; one state requires less
than $500,000 in liability coverage; three states do not specify a required amount of
liability coverage; and 15 states require amounts that vary based upon factors such as the
type of attraction.
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SECTION 11. Requirement of Incident Data Reporting
(A)
In the event of a fatality or serious injury requiring immediate overnight
hospitalization arising out of the operation of an amusement attraction, the
operator of the amusement attraction shall file a incident report with the
Department within 48 hours from the time of the fatality or serious injury
requiring immediate overnight hospitalization.
(B)
The incident report shall be in writing on a form promulgated by the
Department and shall identify the amusement attraction on which the incident
occurred, the identity of all individuals suffering a fatality or serious injury
requiring immediate overnight hospitalization and shall generally describe the
nature of the incident.
(C)
In addition to filing a written incident report, an amusement attraction
operator shall also immediately notify a designated agent or employee of the
Department by telephone of any incident resulting in a fatality.
(D)
Written and verbal incident reports filed with the Department shall not be
subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court
proceeding or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising
from any incident subject to the provisions of this Section.
Comment
At least 24 states have a fixed-site amusement attraction safety law which requires
that amusement attraction operators report certain injury incidents to the State. All such
states require that amusement attractions operators report deaths and serious injuries to
the state regulating entity. At least eight states have laws that may require the reporting
of non-serious injuries. The types of incidents required by these states to be reported
include: injuries requiring medical treatment, injuries requiring hospitalization, “any
accident”, non-minor injuries, and injuries requiring “more than first aid.”
The time frame for reporting such incidents range from immediately to within
four hours to by the next business day to within 48 hours. At least one state only requires
incidents to be reported on a quarterly basis while at least one other state requires that
such incidents be reported every two years. At least two states have laws that do not
specifically state the time frame within which incidents must be reported.
At least four states place the burden of reporting an incident upon the injured
guest rather than the fixed-site amusement attraction operator.
SECTION 12. Requirement of Records Retention
(A)
An amusement attraction operator shall retain the following records for a
period of five years:
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(1)
the name and last known address of each individual that suffers a
serious injury requiring immediate overnight hospitalization; and
(2)
the initial inspection certificate and all renewal inspection
certificates for each amusement attraction.
(B)
Records whose retention is required by subsection (A) shall be available
for inspection by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee during
normal business hours.
Comment
At least 17 states require fixed-site amusement attractions operators to maintain
incident records or maintenance records for varying lengths of time.
SECTION 13. Inspection Fees
A fee in the following amount shall accompany any application for an amusement
attraction inspection:
(A)

[$] for an initial application for a pre-operation inspection;

(B)

[$] for an application for all subsequent inspections.

(C)
All such fees shall be deposited into the Amusement Attraction Safety
Fund created by Section 20 of this [Act].
Comment
While the amount of fees is left for each State to determine, it is highly
recommended that these fees be specifically assigned to a separate amusement attraction
safety fund in order to mitigate increased state expenditures that might result from the
enactment of such a law.
SECTION 14. Requirements of Amusement Attraction Attendants
(A)

An amusement attraction attendant shall:
(1)
be at least 16 years of age;
(2)
control only one amusement attraction at a single time;
(3)
remain within the immediate proximity of the amusement
attraction under the attendant’s control; and,
(4)
not be under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance.

(B)
An amusement attraction operator shall not be responsible for the conduct
of any attendant who purposefully violates the requirements of this Section unless
the operator had sufficient prior notice to reasonably prevent such conduct.
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Comment
At least 13 states have laws that require attraction attendants to be of a minimum
age. Five of these states require that the ride operator be at least 18 years of age while
eight of these states require that the ride operator be at least 16 years of age.
SECTION 15. Requirement of Safety Information Posting
(A)
An amusement attraction operator shall post in a conspicuous and
permanent location at each amusement attraction the following safety
information:
(1)
A concise summary of guidelines for safe guest use of the
amusement attraction; and,
(2)
A concise summary of recommended and/or mandatory guest use
restrictions of the amusement attraction; and,
(3)
A concise summary of prohibited guest conduct relative to the use
of the amusement attraction; and,
(4)
A statement that reads: "State law requires guests to obey all
warnings and directions for this attraction and behave in a manner that will
not cause or contribute to injuring themselves or others. Violators may be
punished by fine and/or imprisonment."
(B)
Nothing in this Section shall operate to limit an amusement attraction
operator’s right to revoke a guest’s admittance privilege or otherwise implement
reasonable administrative measures to address guest violations of this Section,
Section (17) of this [Act], or Section (18) of this [Act].
Comment
At least 16 states have laws that require an amusement attraction operator to post
for guests certain safety information related to the amusement attraction.
SECTION 16. Requests for Regulatory Variances
(A)
An amusement attraction operator may apply to the Commissioner for a
variance from the requirements of this [Act] or any regulation promulgated
pursuant to this [Act] if:
(1)
a variance is necessary to prevent an undue hardship upon the
amusement attraction operator; and,
(2)
the Department has concluded that the issuance of the variance will
not limit or prejudice the safe use of the amusement attractions by guests.
(B)
No variance shall be issued for an amusement attraction that has
previously failed to pass an inspection pursuant to Section 7 of this [Act].
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Comment
At least, 14 states have laws that provide a mechanism for an amusement
attraction operator to request a variance from existing safety regulatory requirements.
SECTION 17. Right to Refuse Entry
(A)
An amusement attraction operator may refuse entry to the amusement
attraction to any guest if the operator reasonably believes that allowing the guest
to enter may jeopardize the safety of the guest or any other individual including,
without limitation, other guests, employees of the operator, agents of the operator
or bystanders.
(B)
An operator shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for any refusal to
permit entry if the operator’s refusal is based upon a reasonable belief that the
guest’s entry may jeopardize the safety of any individual.
Comment
At least 13 states permit amusement attraction operators the right to refuse entry
to certain members of the general public if necessary for safety requirements. While
intended to address situations where certain physical characteristics of an individual
might increase safety risks to that individual or others, such provisions must obviously be
drafted to avoid a violation of the American with Disabilities Act or similar type of
statute.
SECTION 18. Guest Safety Duties
(A)
Each guest shall comply with the following safety duties related to the use
of an amusement attraction:
(1)
Each guest shall comply with all written warnings and directions
that require a person to satisfy certain conditions or to refrain from certain
actions regarding use of amusement ride; and,
(2)
Each guest shall refrain from engaging in any behavior or conduct
during use of an amusement attraction that may cause or contribute to
injuring the guest or any other individual.
(B)
Any guest that fails to comply with any of the safety duties in this Section
shall be considered in breach of that duty and subject to a misdemeanor offense
pursuant to [State’s criminal code or equivalent].
Comment
At least 13 states have laws that contain a provision outlining the duties and
responsibilities of guests of an amusement attraction. These laws, often termed Rider
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Responsibility Laws, generally prohibit a guest from engaging in certain conduct that
might increase the safety risks to that individual or other guests.
SECTION 19. Enforcement and Penalties
(A)
Criminal Penalty. An amusement attraction operator who violates this
[Act] is guilty of a [misdemeanor] [felony] and, upon conviction, is punishable by
[fine and/or imprisonment].
(B)
Administrative Penalty. The Commissioner may assess an administrative
penalty against an amusement attraction operator not to exceed [$] for a violation
of this [Act].
Comment
Of the 48 states that currently have laws regulating fixed-site amusement
attractions, 38 of those states have provisions that allow the Commissioner (or other state
governmental authority) to assess administrative fines against an amusement attraction
operator for violating the law or regulations.
The procedure for imposing an administrative penalty under this Act and
complying with due process requirements are hereby reserved for the State's
administrative procedures law or equivalent law.

SECTION 20. Amusement Attraction Safety Fund
(A)
All inspection fees received under this [Act] shall be deposited into a
special revenue account located in the state treasury and known as the
"Amusement Attraction Safety Fund".
(B)
The Department shall use the monies in this account to enforce the
provisions of this article, subject to disbursement guidelines promulgated by the
[State Treasurer or equivalent].
Comment
At least eight states have provisions within their fixed-site amusement attraction
safety law that establish a dedicated amusement attraction fund. The establishment of
such a dedicated fund is recommended as a method for tracking the expenses of a fixedsite amusement attraction regulatory effort as well as ensuring that the fees and fines
generated from that effort are utilized to pay for at least a portion of the additional
expenditures resulting from this effort.
SECTION 21. Limitation of Governmental Liability
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No portion of this [Act] shall be construed as subjecting the State or any political
subdivision of the State to any liability resulting from any injury or damages involving an
amusement attraction.
SECTION 22. Confidentiality of Proprietary Information
The Department shall not disclose any information submitted to the Department by an
amusement attraction operator pursuant to the requirements of this [Act] that is marked as
“Proprietary” or “Confidential” by the operator unless the Department is directed to do so
by an order or decree from a court of competent jurisdiction.
SECTION 23. Severability.
If any provision of this [Act] is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
remainder of this [Act] shall be remain valid and enforced.
SECTION 24. Repealed Acts and Chapters.
The following acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed: [ ]
SECTION 25. Effective Date.
This [Act] shall take effect as of [ ].
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